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THE PROBLEM OF (IN)EXPERIENCE AND REGULATOR EXPERTISE
JOHN CRAWFORD*
Abstract
A comprehensive approach to minimizing the long-term costs
of financial crises must include efforts to train regulators to respond
effectively to crisis dynamics when they arise. An important gap exists,
however, in our current approach: a uniquely effective building block
for developing crisis-fighting skills is relevant experience, but the
infrequency of crises translates to a dearth of opportunities for
regulators to attain the necessary experience and develop the pertinent
skills. This Article proposes to fill this gap by employing role-playing
crisis simulations-or wargames-to create synthetic crisis-fighting
experiences. Wargames can provide regulators with a repertoire of
crisis experiences that they will have "lived," in a real if attenuated
way, which can then aid them in perceiving key patterns and anomalies
and in anticipating potential consequences ofdecisions to intervene (or
not) under the intense time pressure and stress of an actual crisis.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
Law. I am grateful for helpful comments and suggestions to Abe Cable, Jared
Ellias, Erik Gerding, John Hunt, Zach Price, Morgan Ricks, Jodi Short, Bill
Wang, and participants at the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the
Bay Area Corporate Law Scholars Workshop, and the UC Hastings Junior
Faculty Workshop.
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Financial crises are infrequent but severe. When they hit, their
severity can be mitigated by an effective government response. The
quality of the government's response depends largely on regulators
making good decisions under conditions of intense time pressure and
uncertainty. A regulator with expertise rooted in crisis-fighting
experience will be better equipped to limit crisis costs. Unhappily for
regulator expertise (though happily for the economy), the infrequency
of crises means there is a paucity of opportunity to attain relevant
experience. This Article explores the possibility of manufacturing
experience-based crisis-fighting expertise for regulators and argues that
role-playing crisis simulations-or wargames-can provide a uniquely
effective way to train them to make better decisions and limit cnisis
costs in the future.
This inquiry differs markedly from previous analyses of
regulators' role in the financial crisis of 2008 and offers prescriptions
for the future. Excellent work has been done, for example, on the
institutional and individual incentives regulators face, but assumes that
if those incentives are properly calibrated and aligned with the public
welfare, the ability of regulators to carry out their duties can be taken as
given.' Getting incentives right is extremely important, but this Article
wrestles with a different question: assuming regulators are properly
incentivized, is it even possible for them to get the experience they need
to do theirjob effectively?
Another line of commentary holds that it is futile to rely on
regulators to prevent crises; this position often supports arguments that
market forces are the best (and perhaps only) tool capable of reining in
moral hazard and disciplining the financial system to serve the public
interest (if only regulators would get out of the way).2 This Article
argues that while there almost certainly are areas where reliance on
regulatory supervision is futile, in other areas regulators matter
immensely. Specifically, relying on regulators to predict the future path
of asset prices is likely a fool's errand, but reliance may be entirely
justified with respect to two other vital tasks: reducing vulnerabilities in
the system prior to a crisis, and taking discrete actions after initial
1 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., John A. Allison, Market Discipline Beats Regulatory Discipline, 34
CATO J. 345, 345 (2014) ("I can tell you with absolute certainty that market
discipline beats regulatory discipline. In fact .... regulatory discipline will
always fail to reduce volatility and will slow economic growth.").
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losses have occurred to prevent them from propagating through the
system. This Article's concern is with the lattermost undertaking, and
specifically how we might improve regulators' decisions about whether
and how to intervene at key junctures in a crisis to try to stop losses
from metastasizing.
The task is essential, for a vibrant economy inevitably entails
some risk of a crisis. Preparedness must, therefore, augment efforts to
rein in risk ex ante. This Article delineates the contours of the crisis-
related tasks for which regulator efficacy is possible and preparedness
(therefore) useful.3 It identifies loss-propagation dynamics that are
persistent across financial crises, and argues that regulators with the
appropriate skill set can make reliably better decisions about when and
how to intervene to mitigate these dynamics.4 It then explains why
experience is an important part of developing this skill set. As stated,
however, the very infrequency of crises makes attaining the necessary
experience a challenge.5 The Article proposes wargames as a possible
solution to the problem of regulator crisis-fighting inexperience.6 It
describes wargames as they are used by various organizations, and
provides an account of their benefits, along with potential obstacles to
their effective use as a training tool.'
Part II begins by explaining the scope of what the Article aims
to accomplish and distinguishing its claims from previous work on
regulatory efficacy. It then explores the feasibility of preventing cnises
altogether by reducing risk in the system. Much of the focus of
regulators and legal scholars since the crisis has been on reducing
systemic risk.8  This is appropriate: addressing certain key
vulnerabilities, such as excessive leverage, constitutes the most
powerful tool we have to lessen crisis costs over the long run.9 Further,
the crisis revealed areas of great fragility, many of which arguably have
yet to be fully addressed. In reforming the system, however, there must
come a point beyond which the prophylactic steps to reduce risk are not
worth the forgone dynamism and growth. To take an extreme example,
outlawing debt could end financial crises, but would be akin to solving
the problem of traffic accidents by prohibiting driving. A vibrant
3 See infra Part III.A.
4 See infra Part III.B.
5 See infra Part III.G.
6 See infra Part IV.
7 See infra Part IV.
" See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9 See infra text accompanying note 35.
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financial system creates both rewards and risks; we cannot have the
first without the second. In the absence of staggeringly costly financial
repression, there will always be some risk of crisis-like dynamics
ansing.
In Part III, I take up two lines of inquiry that frame the scope of
what we can realistically expect of regulators in responding to crisis
dynamics. First, given the uncertainty surrounding crises, is it even
possible to develop expertise in responding to them? Part III.A draws
on research from cognitive psychology that shows that skilled intuition
(meaning true expertise rooted in experience) is possible only in
environments with some stability in the relationship between causes
and effects. While I do not question the uncertainty inherent in any
financial crisis, nor the futility of relying on regulators (or anyone) to
predict all the shocks that could cause a crisis, I argue that once cnisis
dynamics have arisen, they possess certain persistent structural
similarities that can ground authentic expertise.'0 The structural
similarities play out through one or more of a handful of mechanisms
by which initial losses can be amplified, causing damage to the real
economy potentially orders of magnitude greater than the initial,
triggering losses." Part III.B examines these mechanisms in detail, as
well as some of the ways regulators can intervene to try to halt them.
The second line of inquiry, considered in III.C, addresses the
question of why experience-as opposed to other types of
preparation-is important in developing expertise. Is there something
about engaging with the actual oversight of the financial system during
a crisis that prepares a regulator for problems more effectively (or at
least differently) than, for example, reading the latest academic study?
12
As in many complex areas, it is possible to articulate valid standards to
guide action in a financial crisis, but such standards often do not admit
of straightforward application.13 Key factual elements necessary to
determine how a standard should be applied may be difficult to discern,
and a variety of previously unconsidered facts may weigh against the
application of a particular standard, or may argue for a modified
approach, in a given situation. It would be impracticable to articulate
rules for every possible scenario. Exposure to a variety of different
scenarios can, however, permit key actors to reason more ffectively by
10 See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Part III.A.2.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 260-67.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 279-81.
2014-2015
REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW
analogy in trying to apply standards to the complicated fact patterns of
an actual crisis.
Part III.D considers some particular challenges to effective
regulatory interventions in a crisis (of the sort discussed in Part Il.B),
shedding further light on why experience is important for the skillful
application of valid guidelines to complicated fact patterns. Part III.E
illustrates these challenges in greater depth in the context of a brief case
study of the events leading up to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Part
III.F briefly considers the experience of regulators in the recent crisis,
and Part III.G crystallizes the particular challenge we face in trying to
build regulator cisis-fighting expertise: accepting that crisis-fighting
expertise can be developed in important part by experience, how can
regulators get such experience?
Part IV of the Article proposes wargames as a possible way to
manufacture crisis-fighting experience for regulators. Parts IV.A and B
define wargames as they are used by the military, other government
units, and private parties. The wargames contemplated here are neither
board games nor full-fledged field exercises, but "conference-table"
games where key players are assigned roles and must respond to crisis
scenarios, determining with their decisions the path the wargame
narrative takes. Wargames are not entirely new to financial regulators;
for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") has
used wargames to familiarize its staff and other relevant regulators with
the contours and constraints of its new Orderly Liquidation Authority
("OLA"), authorized under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. 14 The use of
wargames has, however, been limited in both scope and frequency.
Wargames are not a systematic part of training top regulators to
respond to different possible shocks, and their potential as a research
tool and as a training tool for financial regulators has yet to be fully
tapped.
Part IV.C explores wargames' potential for training regulators
to make better decisions. Wargames, if carried out effectively, give
regulators the opportunity to build a repertoire of crisis experiences that
they will have "lived," in a real if attenuated way-a repertoire, that is,
of fact patterns illustrating plausible cause-and-effect relationships
between interventions and outcomes during a crisis, upon which they
can draw when facing a real crisis. An additional advantage may arise
because a long period without extreme turnoil-perhaps facilitated, in
part, by effective governmental responses to crisis-like dynamics-
often creates market and regulatory complacency in the face of
14 See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
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excessive risk building in the system.15 Wargames could serve as an
antidote to such complacency.
Part IV.D considers potential obstacles to wargames' utility in
filling the gap of regulator inexperience. Challenges range from the risk
of "getting it wrong" (that is, basing wargame scenarios on models that
do not map sufficiently closely onto the real world) to regulator inertia
or resistance (where, for example, an honest assessment of a wargame
would lead to uncomfortable disruptions to the status quo).16 These
obstacles are not insurmountable, but they do counsel care and caution
in the design and implementation of wargames. Part V concludes.
II. Background
A. The Plausible Scope of Regulator Expertise
In exploring what regulators can do to prevent or mitigate
damage from crises, it is important to distinguish between a
recessionary shock to the economy-for example, an asset bubble
bursting-and the ways in which this shock might ripple through the
financial system, causing losses to multiply on its way. 7 Former
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bemanke provides a useful way of
framing the distinction when he compares the aftermaths of two
bubbles-housing in the years leading up to the recent crisis, and the
dot-com bubble at the turn of the millennium. 8 The magnitude of stock
market losses following the dot-com bust was on the order of $8
trillion-even greater than the total peak-to-trough losses (roughly $7
trillion) on all U.S. residential real estate from 2006 through 2011.19
But the dot-com bust resulted in no financial turmoil and a relatively
15 See infra text accompanying note 273.
16 See infra Part IV.D.
17 While this distinction serves valuable heuristic purposes in thinking about
the possibilities and limitations of policy and regulation, I should note that I do
not mean to make a deep ontological claim here. There may, for example, be
some malleability in whether we categorize a particular event as a "trigger" or
as a later-falling "domino" in a crisis, depending on the scope and purposes of
the particular narrative.
" See generally Ben S. Bernanke, Chainnan, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr.
13, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20120413a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VGF9-HXPS.
19 1d. at 2-3.
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minor recession." Why, then, the disproportionate impact of the
housing bust? Bemanke's view is that the disparity was due principally
to where the losses fell: "In the case of dot-com stocks, losses were
spread relatively widely across many types of investors. In contrast,
following the housing and mortgage bust, losses were felt
disproportionately at key nodes of the financial system ....,, 21
These "key nodes"-such as broker-dealers and structured
investment vehicles22 -tended to be highly leveraged and funded
themselves in large part with short-term, rn-prone loans.23 Both the
high leverage and the fact that creditors could withdraw funding on
very short notice from systemically important financial institutions
contributed to loss-amplifying dynamics.
The loss-amplifying dynamics of the recent crisis will be
considered in greater detail in Section Ill.B, infra; adumbrating the
distinction here can, however, help define what is reasonable to expect
of regulators, even of those with the greatest intelligence, integrity, and
commitment. I am skeptical of regulators' ability to protect the system
by predicting and preventing every potential recessionary shock to the
economy. Regulators can, however, do two things to make shocks less
damaging: (i) ex ante, reduce systemic vulnerabilities on which
"shocks" or triggers may work, and (ii) ex post, act to dampen the loss-
amplification dynamics that arise once a triggering event has occurred.
The legal literature since the Crisis has focused largely (though far from
exclusively) on the ex ante reduction of vulnerabilities.24 Reducing
20 
id.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id. A structured investment vehicle, or SIV, "is a limited-purpose operating
company that . . . purchas[es] mostly highly rated medium- and long-tenn
fixed income assets and fund[s] itself with cheaper, mostly short-term, highly
rated [commercial paper] and [medium tenn notes]." GARY B. GORTON,
SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 106 (2010).
23 See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 22, at 43-44.
21 See generally, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive
Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 359 (2009) (proposing deferred compensation to ensure financial
executives take account of tail risk); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann,
Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 (2010) (proposing a change in
executive compensation practices to dampen executives' risk-taking
incentives); Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1289 (2012) [hereinafter Ricks, Regulatory Design] (proposing
government insurance of deposit-like "money claims," combined with the
extension of risk-constraint regulation to all firms that issue such claims); Mark
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systemic vulnerabilities is essential, but, as explained in Section I.B, is
unlikely to guarantee the end of crises. The concern of this Article is
with what can be done to limit damage once a shock has occurred and
crisis-like dynamics have already kicked in-and how regulators may
develop the necessary skills to perform well in a crisis.
J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REv. 539 (2011) (arguing that the repayment priority
derivatives counterparties receive in bankmptcy weakens their incentive to
monitor financial finns, etiolating market discipline); Richard Squire,
Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1151
(2010) (calling for regulatory focus on the problem of "correlation-seeking,"
wherein firms take fees for assuming contingent debts whose triggers correlate
with the firms' own insolvency risks); Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies,
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why
Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive (Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at-http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
research/documents/Fallacies%2ONov%/ 201.pdf, archived at http://pena.cc/
77K9-TDP4 (arguing for heightened capital requirements as a way to lessen
the risk and costs of bank insolvency). Mehrsa Baradaran has recently written
on regulatory efforts to target and address weaknesses in the financial system
by constructing hypotheticals, particularly through the stress tests and living
wills prescribed by the Dodd-Frank Act. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by
Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247 (2014). She suggests that supplementing
current efforts with financial wargames may address shortcomings in the
current approach. Id. While Baradaran's focus on addressing weaknesses ex
ante is consistent with the use of wargames advocated here, my concern is
more with developing regulator expertise in crisis response than with
wargames' ability (or inability) to predict future shocks or expose hitherto
unperceived vulnerabilities.
The literature on financial crisis response rather than prevention has
had two primary areas of focus. The first involves mechanisms to try to ensure
the automatic injection of necessary capital into wobbly banks in a crisis. See
generally, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting
Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic
Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151 (2011) (proposing a
trillion-dollar insurance fund to inject capital into financial finns in the throes
of a systemic crisis). The second is the resolution of insolvent financial firms.
See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV.
Bus. L. REv. 75, 122-29 (2011) [hereinafter Ricks, Regulating Money
Creation] (providing a negative assessment of the crisis-prevention potential of
the OLA created under the Dodd-Frank Act); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 707, 754-57 (2010) (laying out the criteria for an effective
resolution regime).
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While there has been less academic work on regulatory
responses to crises, as opposed to efforts to prevent them, there is a rich
literature on the factors that affect regulator performance more
generally. This Article complements that literature by focusing
specifically on the importance of experience in the development of
regulator skills. Experience has been understood as an essential
ingredient of regulator expertise at least since the New Deal,26 but it is
generally taken for granted that regulators will have the opportunity to
attain the relevant experience in the course of their duties (or, perhaps,
prior thereto)27-an assumption that is likely justified in many or most
instances.
28
The literature on financial regulators in the wake of the crisis,
as well as a few actual reforms affecting front-line regulators, has
focused principally on regulators' incentives to be diligent, critical,
proactive, and honest, rather than on expertise per se.29 Getting
25 See generally, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for
Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (2012) (suggesting that
perfonnance-based pay for financial regulators could improve regulatory
oversight).
26 See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. 399, 433
(2007). In a typical passage, for example, the Supreme Court stated,
In [upholding a particular unfair trade practice] we give great weight
to the Commission's conclusion, as this Court has done in other cases
.... [T]he Court [has] called attention to the express intention of
Congress to create an agency whose membership would at all times
be experienced, so that its conclusions would be the result of an
expertness coming from experience ....
Id. at 433 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948) (alterations
in original)).
27 The political science literature on regulator and agency expertise has, for
example, tended either to assume expertise as an exogenous variable, or to
build it into a model as an endogenous variable (depending, for example, on
the scope of agency discretion vis-h-vis the legislature), but under the
assumption that developing expertise is a straightforward function of effort (or
investment of time and other resources). See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson,
Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 469, 470 (2007).
28 Casual empiricism suggests that most essential tasks of most regulators are
persistent or regularly recurring parts of their jobs.
29 See generally, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 25 (proposing
compensating regulators with subordinated debt of the firms they regulate, so
that they internalize the costs of the downside risk these firms are taking and
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incentives right is critically important. This Article, however, deals with
a different question: assuming financial regulators' incentives are
appropriately aligned with the public and the legislature, how can we
ensure that they are prepared to carry out the tasks we ask of them?
30
B. Are Crises Inevitable?
One might wonder why preparing regulators to deal with cnises
is worth the trouble; wouldn't it be more effective simply to eliminate
the risk of crises altogether? There are at least three (overlapping) ways
regulators might try to eliminate the risk of a crisis. First, they could try
to prevent shocks or triggers from occurring in the first place.3' While
assume a more proactive role in resolving problems and constraining risk);
Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1629, 1632-33 (2011) (arguing for greater use of "regulatory
contrarians," which they define as "entit[ies] that [are] affiliated with, but
independent of, a financial regulator with the task of monitoring that regulator
and the regulated marketplace and publicly suggesting new initiatives or
potential structural or personnel changes"); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers,
Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services
Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012) (questioning whether regulators under
the current structure can adequately represent the public interest, and
suggesting that a "Public Interest Council" should be established to serve this
end). Note as well that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency-the
chief regulator for nationally chartered banks-has recently instituted a stricter
system of review for its examiners, with a view to holding them accountable
for their failures in oversight. See Michael R. Crittenden, Bank Examiners to
Face Rigorous Reviews, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2013, at C5. The (vey
reasonable) implicit assumption seems to be that regulators will do better if
they face more direct consequences for failing to do a good job.
30 See ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 500
(2014) ("[R]ecognizing that financial regulators are members of a profession
that requires intellectual resources and strategic foresight-and not a mere
bureaucracy that demands the occasional stick or carrot-can do much to
ensure that regulators faithfully and competently execute their responsibilities
...."). Gerding points to the military's and foreign service's efforts to
"cultivate norms and develop intellectual capital," making use of institutions
such as "in-house graduate schools (such as war colleges), policy planning
anus, and think tanks," as well as by exposing personnel to foreign counterpart
personnel and institutions. Id. at 498-99.
" See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-
Market Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REv. 977,
1006-36 (2007) (outlining different legal approaches to preventing asset
2014-2015
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regulators should certainly be alive to potential triggers, and prevent
them to the degree possible,32 it would be foolhardy to rely on
regulators to foresee and forestall every possible shock. Consider in this
respect that while we may be very alive to the risk of a housing bubble
today, the next trigger might be a different asset bubble going "pop! ",
or the default of a foreign sovereign, or a cyber-attack on the US
financial system, or a natural disaster, or-if the system is sufficiently
vulnerable-a little boy yelling (as in Mary Poppins) "give me back my,,33 34
money! , and so on.
bubbles from developing, and concluding that the effectiveness of such
methods for eliminating bubbles is likely weak).
32 See GERDING, supra note 30, at 47-48 (citing economic research on early
"warning signs" of bubbles, including "cheap credit," "high[] leverage," "a
surge of external capital flowing into a country," and "an influx of
inexperienced investors into a market"). Indeed, it would be irresponsible for
financial regulators not to keep their eyes peeled for potential signs of
overheating in different asset markets, and regulators do, in fact, keep watch
for such signs. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath & Victoria McGrane, Fed Eyes Bubble
Risks, Minutes Show, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2014, at Al.
33 MARY POPPINS (Walt Disney Productions 1964). In the movie, young
Michael Banks goes to visit his father's bank, and some of the bank employees
try to convince him to put his money (tuppence) into a savings account. Id.
When they take the tuppence from him, he yells "Give it back! Give me back
my money!" Id. Other customers in the bank hear him and panic, thinking that
the bank is unable to meet a withdrawal demand. Id. Thus starts a nm on the
bank. Id. The reference is not entirely whimsical; the possibility of a bank nm
starting not because of legitimate news about the actual condition of the bank,
but rather because of depositor fears of others running on the bank-making a
nm a self-fulfilling prophecy-has been famously modeled by Diamond and
Dybvig. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 410 (1983) ("The problem is
that once [depositors] have deposited, anything that causes them to anticipate a
nm will lead to a nm.").
3' Trying to predict the source of the next crisis is where the problem of "black
swans" looms largest. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE
IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, at xvii (2007). As defined by Nicholas
Taleb, a black swan is an extreme event that does not accord with previous
patterns of experience. Id. Again, even if black swans are inherently
unpredictable-which implies that it is impossible to get better at anticipating
them-I argue that the ability to respond to the specific loss propagation
dynamics a black swan could trigger in the financial system is an activity at
which regulators can improve. It is also important to remember that even if one
may not be able to predict exactly what will cause a phase transition into panic
Vol. 34
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A second way to try to prevent crises is to eliminate
vulnerabilities in the system.35  Mitigating vulnerabilities is an
mode, there are likely reliable signs that the system is more or less vulnerable
to such a transition. See GERDING, supra note 30, at 47-48.
Among the reasons it is so difficult to foretell exactly where and when a
tipping point into crisis will occur is the phenomenon of nonlinearity. This
refers to systems where the "inputs" are not (necessarily) proportional to the
"outputs." See Nonlinearity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
tenns/n/nonlinearity.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/UQ25-SYMU (defining nonlinearity as "[a] relationship which
cannot be explained as a linear combination of its variable inputs"). Even if
such a system is deterministic and follows relatively simple laws,
immeasurably small differences in initial conditions can lead to large
differences in outcomes. See id. The most famous example is Edward Lorenz's
"butterfly effect." Edward N. Lorenz, Predictability; Does the Flap of a
Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas? (Dec. 29, 1972),
available at http://eaps4.nit.edu/research/Lorenz/Butterfly_1972.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/9587-HX27 ("If a single flap of a butterfly's wings can be
instrumental in generating a tornado, so also can . . . the activities of
innumerable more powerful creatures, including our own species."). Alan
Beyerchen provides a lucid explanation of the logic and import of Lorenz's
work:
Edward Lorenz set up three linked first-order differential equations in
a computer model of weather development. With certain parameters,
the system proved so sensitive to the initial conditions that it was
estimated that quite literally a butterfly flapping its wings in one part
of the world would be sufficient to cause a major stonn to emerge
somewhere else. An arbitirarily small change could generate an
entirely different history for the system.
Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Non-linearity, and the Unpredictability of War,
17 INT'L SECURITY 59, 66 (1992).
The butterfly effect arises from a "complex adaptive system[]i"-that
is, a system "comprised of a macroscopic, heterogeneous set of autonomous
agents interacting and adapting in response to one another and to external
environment inputs." J.B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 885, 887 (2008). For a good description of how the theory of these
systems applies to the financial system, see generally Robert M. May et al.,
Ecology for Bankers, 451 NATuRE 893 (2008).
"s This could, of course, have the effect of preventing certain sorts of bubbles
from popping in the first place, thus overlapping with the first method
described directly above. There are nonetheless two reasons that it is worth
treating the approaches as distinct. First, bubbles popping are not the only
plausible trigger for a crisis (think again of a cyber-attack or an oil supply
shock). See Teny Macalister, Background: What Caused the 1970s Oil Price
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extremely important regulatory task; the question is whether all
vulnerabilities could be wrung out of the system. I will venture here
that they could be, if we were willing to bear the cost. We are not,
however, willing to do so. We could, for example, require all financial
intermediaries to fund themselves entirely with equity, and force those
desiring the money storage and transaction processing services of a
bank account to use "currency warehouses" with 100 percent reserve
requirements.36 This would eliminate bank runs and the loss-
amplification mechanisms described below, but would entail staggering
costs, as the funds people and businesses reserve for near-term
transactional purposes would then be unavailable to be lent out to
37
creditworthy consumers or job-creating businesses. There is, then, a
trade-off involved in setting and enforcing risk-constraint measures.
Financial stability is clearly desirable, but as Gary Gorton notes, really
eliminating any risk of crisis could impose unacceptable costs.
38
The great "Quiet Period" in American finance39 -the period
between the 1930s and the recent crisis, during which there were no
system-wide panics or runs on the financial system-may suggest a
third way to prevent (most of) the destructive dynamics of a financial
crisis. A sine qua non of the Quiet Period was the institution of federal
deposit insurance for bank accounts.4 °
Shock?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2011/mar/03/1970s-oil-price-shock, archived at http://penna.cc/
TN86-NCRM (discussing how an oil embargo triggered an economic risis).
Second, it is possible to allow speculation that feeds a bubble without risking a
financial crisis if, as with dot-com stocks, losses fall on shareholders rather
than (short-term) creditors. See Kenneth S. Rogoff, Sovereign Debt in the
Second Great Contraction: Is This Time Different?, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH REP., no. 3, 2011 at 2.
36 See Ricks, Regulating Money Creation, supra note 24, at 98 n.55.
37 Id. at 100.
38 GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE
DON'T SEE THEM COMING 177-78 (2012) ("We could design a financial
system that avoids crises, for a period of time at least, but the design faces the
problem of risking a crisis on the one hand or being financially repressive on
the other.... If a policymaker, whose goal is to maximize GDP growth, could
choose whether to have periodic crises or not, the policymaker might choose to
have crises rather than to have low growth. It depends how society feels about
economic volatility.").
39 GORTON, supra note 22, at 11.
40 Ricks, Regulating Money Creation, supra note 24, at 119. Deposit insurance
was not the sole cause of the Quiet Period; as Gary Gorton has noted, other key
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In the decades leading up to the recent crisis, however, bank-
like functions had migrated increasingly to institutions outside the
umbrella of deposit insurance and traditional bank regulation-the
"shadow banking" system. For example, instead of a bank using funds
from deposits to make (and hold) a mortgage loan, a broker-dealer
might hold a mortgage-backed security and use it as collateral for a
short-term loan.41 These short-term loans often have a maturity of just
one day, but in normal times are routinely rolled over.42 The
institutional investors that make such loans can withdraw funding
rapidly, thus functioning very much like depositors before the creation
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.43
The most acute phases of the recent crisis involved runs on
"shadow banks." Perhaps we could prevent many, if not all, of the loss-
amplifying mechanisms described in Part II.B, infra, if we extended
federal guarantees to the shadow banking system on a permanent
basis.44 But this would create significant moral hazard issues. Various
risk-constraint regulations and supervision might limit the moral hazard
costs to acceptable levels, but it is worth noting that one of the principal
measures to counter moral hazard in the context of federal deposit
factors include "the 'stick' of bank regulations and examinations" as well as
"the 'carrot,' ... of monopoly rents that made the charter valuable." GORTON,
supra note 22, at 54.
41 See TOBIAS ADRIAN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT
No. 529, REPO AND SECURITIES LENDING 2 (2013), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr529.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/99D5-QCJM.
42 The most typical such day-to-day loan is the sale and repurchase agreement,
or "repo" loan. See id. at 4.
13 See id.
" The U.S. government's response to the crisis in 2008 involved temporarily
extending its guarantees to large swaths of the shadow banking system. See
infra note 76 and accompanying text. For proposals to extend the government
guarantees more broadly on a permanent basis, see, e.g., Ricks, Regulatory
Design, supra note 24, at 1290, 1343-54; Ricardo J. Caballero, The "Other"
Imbalance and the Financial Crisis 37 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15636, Jan. 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w15636.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QF7U-TUTH ("One approach
to deal with this dual problem-the shortage of safe assets and the financial
fragility created by the private sector's solutions to it-is for governments
around the world [sic] explicitly absorb a larger share of the systemic risk (and
be compensated for it). This approach would include modifying their portfolios
and becoming the provider of insurance of last resort, and not just the lender of
last resort, for widespread panics.").
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insurance-caps on the insurable amount in each account-would be
difficult to apply to the shadow banking system, where the rise in recent
decades of gargantuan asset pools has meant that institutions regularly
wish to park enormous sums in "safe," deposit-like accounts.45 In any
event, the toxic political and public reaction to the bailouts of Wall
Street during the recent crisis make it unlikely that such guarantees will
be implemented any time soon. History tells us that when the activities
of banks or shadow banks lack credible insurance, crises tend to recur
every couple of decades or so.46 With the rise of uninsured deposit-like
claims in the shadow banking sector, there is thus reason to take steps
to prepare for crises.
III. The Problem: The Need for Experience and the Scarcity of
Opportunities to Attain It
This Section reviews research in cognitive psychology on
when expert decision-making (in any domain) is feasible, and identifies
structural features that are persistent across financial crises and that can
ground true expert decision-making. It then explains why experience is
important to developing relevant expertise. It explores some challenges
to effective intervention-illustrating why the context-sensitivity that
experience builds can be vital to developing decision-making skills-
and paints a brief picture of the Lehman Brothers failure in light of
these challenges. Finally, against this backdrop, it explains the gap in
our current scheme: the difficulty of attaining relevant experience.
45See, e.g., Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of
the U.S. Banking System 4-5 (Int'l Monetaiy Fund , Working Paper No.
11/190, 2011), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2011/wpl 1190.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YUZ4-N8W6 (explaining that
"institutional cash pool[s]"-defined as "large, centrally managed short-term
cash balances of global non-financial corporations and institutional
investors"-climbed from approximately $100 billion in 1990 to over $2.2
trillion in 2007, and hovered, post-crisis, at $1.9 trillion in 2010).
46See BEN BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9-
10 (2013) (identifying six banking panics between 1873 and 1914); GORTON,
supra note 38, at 29 (quoting THEODORE GiMAN, FEDERAL CLEARING
HOUSES 183 (1899)) ("Since 1793 [financial] panics have occurred [in the
United States] in the following years: 1797, 1811, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1825,
1837, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1884, 1890, and 1893.").
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A. When Can Experience Ground Authentic
Expertise?
There are a number of areas in which the judgments of
recognized experts are not reliably correct; their expertise is, to a certain
extent, illusory.47 I aim in this Section to defend the possibility of
expertise, and specifically intuitive (i.e., experience-based) expertise, in
the context of financial regulation and crisis-fighting.
1. Conditions for Intuitive Expertise
Daniel Kahneman (among others) has documented a variety of
contexts in which self-styled experts' predictive skills and judgment
wind up being no better than a novice 'S.48 A classic case is the stock
picker.49 Stock pickers might know a great deal about the stock market
and about the businesses of the individual companies whose stocks
they're betting on.50 However, their ability to predict whether a given
company's (risk-adjusted) stock returns will beat or lag the market over
any time period, absent inside information, is usually no better than the
proverbial dart-throwing chimpanzee-despite the fact that they may
have very high subjective confidence in their own judgment.5 '
47See, e.g., GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER 280-82 (1998) (contrasting
skilled intuition with "superstition"). There are different views on which
domains admit of authentic expertise:
At one extreme is the work of Ericsson and Chamess (1994),
suggesting almost anyone can become expert at almost anything,
given enough pactice. At the other extreme is the work of people like
Russo and Shoemaker, suggesting that all of us are inherently biased
and unreliable as decision makers. And in between is the suggestion
by Shanteau that expertise is more easily acquired in some domains
than others.
Id. at 282.48 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOw 212-21 (2011).
49 1d. at 212-16.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 214 ("[F]ew stock pickers, if any, have the skill needed to beat the
market consistently, year after year. Professional investors, including fund
managers, fail a basic test of skill: persistent achievement."). The idea that
individual investors cannot reliably beat the market is an implication of the
"efficient markets model." See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). Most
financial economists today view market efficiency as a relative concept, and
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Gary Klein, on the other hand, has spent his career studying
and explaining cases in which experts' intuitive judgments are reliably
better than a novice's (and emphasizing the key role of experience)."
For example, extensive research on chess masters shows that their
advantage over less-skilled players lies not in deliberation but in
intuition.53 "Most of what differentiates skilled from unskilled chess
players," studies have shown, "is their tacit knowledge, not their ability
to calculate move quality.54 Indeed, "[a]s players get stronger, their
ability to do deliberate search and analysis doesn't seem to get any
better.,55 Another example is a "fireground commander," responsible
for coordinating and directing a fire fighting team's activities in
fighting a blaze.56 There are extensive guidelines for fighting fires, but
veterans can draw on a repertoire of experiences and fact patterns that
aid them in making better decisions than a novice could in applying (or
departing from) general guidelines in specific contexts.57
measure it by the speed with which market prices incorporate new infornation.
Lariy Swedroe, The Impact of News Events on Market Prices, CBS
MONEYWATCH (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:37 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-
impact-of-news-events-on-market-prices/, archived at http://perima.cc/UVX9-
TJYU. The literature on market inefficiencies is vast; for a good introduction to
some of this literature aimed at a legal audience, see generally William K.S.
Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 341 (1986). It is also widely accepted that markets cannot, in fact, be
perfectly efficient, where perfect efficiency implies that reliable supernormal
profits are impossible. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393,
393 (1980). This is because the arbitrageurs whose activities ensure new
infornation is impounded into market prices must see some (reliable) profit in
their work in order to incur the cost of the activities in the first place. Id.
Hence, there must be an "equilibrium degree of disequilibrium" even in highly
efficient markets. Id.
52 See generally GARY KLEIN, STREETLIGHTS AND SHADOWS (2011).
53 Id. at 73.
54 Id.
55Id. (citing Bruce D. Burns, The Effects of Speed on Skilled Chess
Performance, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 442 (2004); see also Roberta Calderwood et
al., Time Pressure, Skill, and Move Quality in Chess, 101 AM. J. PSYCH. 481,
481 (1988).
56 See Daniel Kalneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A
Failure to Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515, 516 (2009).
51 Id. ("[Fireground commanders] could draw on the repertoire of patterns that
they had compiled during more than a decade of both real and virtual
experience . . . to anticipate how flames were likely to spread through a
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So who is right? Should we trust the intuitive judgments of
experts or not? If some self-styled experts do have superior discernment
and others do not, how can we determine which is which? Kahneman
and Klein, coming from (often bitterly) opposed camps within
cognitive psychology, decided to try to identify their specific
disagreements and wound up co-authoring a paper entitled Conditions
for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure To Disagree.58 In it, they agree that in
some areas, expertise is illusory, while in others, it is very real. 9
(Sometimes, they note, the same person has both illusory and real
expertise, or "fractionated expertise.")" They also agree that the
expert's own subjective confidence in his judgment is worthless as a
guide to when we can trust expertise and when we cannot."
What, then, determines whether an expert's intuitive judgment
62is reliable or not? Kahneman and Klein identify three conditions.
First, there must be "validity" to the environment in which the experts
63operate. This means that there must be some constancy between
objectively identifiable cues and subsequent events-some stable
cause-effect relationships that we can observe .64 This is not, they hasten
to add, incompatible with a large degree of uncertainty in an
environment.65 They point to warfare and poker as two areas where
there is a significant degree of uncertainty, but wherein there are better
moves and worse moves, and making the better moves reliably
increases one's chances of winning.
66
Assuming there is some stability in the environment, there are
two further requirements for experts to be able to develop reliable
building, to notice signs that a house was likely to collapse, to judge when to
call for additional support, and to make many other critical decisions.").
58 See generally id.
51 Id. at 522 ("For example, auditors who have expertise in 'hard' data such as
accounts receivable may do much less well with 'soft' data such as indications
of fraud.") (citation omitted).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 523.
62 See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
63 Kahneman & Klein, supra note 56, at 519.
64 Id. at 520.
65 Id. at 524.
66 Id.
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intuitive judgments: they must have a chance to practice, and they must
have a chance to receive and process feedback.67
The first question we must address, then, is whether the
financial system is the type of valid environment that would permit
experts to learn to anticipate or predict outcomes from currently
observable variables and possible regulatory actions.
2. Are Financial Crises Examples of "Valid
Environments"?
Here again one must distinguish between crisis triggers, on the
one hand, and the mechanisms within the financial system that can
amplify initial investment losses and (greatly) exacerbate damage to the
681real economy. In his memoirs, Hank Paulson recounts a 2006
conversation he had with President Bush that captures just this
distinction between crisis triggers and the sorts of problems that
regulators must respond to once the crisis arises:
"We can't predict when the next crisis will come," I
said. "But we need to be prepared."
In response to a question of the president's, I said it
was impossible to know what might trigger a big
disruption. Using the analogy of a forest fire, I said it
mattered less how the blaze started than it did to be
prepared to contain it-and then put it out.
I was right to be on my guard, but I misread the cause,
and the scale, of the coming disaster. Notably absent
from my presentation was any mention of problems in
housing or mortgages.
69
Consistent with Paulson's account, I am (again) skeptical that the
macroeconomy provides the sort of valid environment that would
ground expertise in predicting where the next shock will come from.
There is good reason to believe, however, that once crisis dynamics
67 Id. ("Other necessaly conditions include adequate opportunities for learning
the environment (prolonged practice and feedback that is both rapid and
unequivocal).").
61 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
6' HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 47 (2010). Paulson's initial
concern was with derivatives. Id. at 46.
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emerge, whatever their trigger, there is some validity to the
environment.
Just as in war, of course, validity does not imply that the
structure of a crisis is immediately clear. In his memoirs, Timothy
Geithner speaks of the "inevitable fog of diagnosis" as a vulnerable
system begins to experience problems, and the difficulty of trying to
determine "whether the initial market turmoil is a healthy adjustment or
the start of a systemic meltdown, a precursor to a modest economic
slowdown or something much worse.,70 Nevertheless, in explaining
why he wrote his memoirs, Geithner states "[a]ll financial crises are
different, but they have a lot in common, and there are lessons to learn
from this extreme one that can help policymakers and the public during
,,71the next one.
Even as the particular institutional details may vary, then, and
even as real-time news and data require extensive interpretation through
the fog of uncertainty, there are structural similarities across cnises.
These include capital holes at-and massive withdrawals of cash
from-key financial intermediaries, leading to the loss amplification
and contagion dynamics described below. Assessing and responding to
these dynamics constitute activities which, I argue, despite all their
uncertainties, can be carried out reliably better or worse.
In summary, the concern of this Article is not with bubbles or
shock prevention, but rather with the possibility of short-circuiting the
loss-propagation mechanisms that result from contagion and panics
among creditors of crippled financial institutions. Whether the next
shock is from a bubble bursting or from something else, the point is to
be prepared not to let loss propagation mechanisms kick into high gear.
B. Loss Propagation Mechanisms and Interventions
If financial crises do provide the sort of valid environment hat
permits reliably better and worse choices by regulators, then we must
be able to explain where the validity lies-i.e., where (conditional)
predictability exists as to how losses work their way through the
system. We must, in other words, be able to outline some of the basic
processes of loss propagation, as well as the sorts of interventions that
can dampen this dynamic. In this Section, I briefly outline some of
these mechanisms and interventions, with a brief nod to the steps
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regulators actually took along these lines during the recent crisis.7 2 For
clarity's sake, the presentation here may make the mechanisms seem
more linear and cut-and-dried than they usually appear to be when, for
example, regulators are struggling to determine whether the market is
experiencing a containable market correction, or the harbingers of
panic. It is important to emphasize, then, that even if these mechanisms
are similar enough across crises to reward experience, addressing them
is far from straightforward.73
It is also worth emphasizing at the start hat the enumeration of
interventions is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and their
division here is somewhat artificial and arbitrary. The intense
interaction among the mechanisms and the firms on which they operate
means that almost any of the interventions described could contribute to
counteracting all of the mechanisms.
Finally, it is important to stress that none of the regulatory
interventions described here are cost-free. The costs include potential
direct losses to taxpayers in the event of a bailout, and losses arising
from moral hazard and the inefficient decisions that it can enable. Of
course, the costs and benefits of each type of move are highly context-
dependent. As I will argue in Section IlI.C, infra, this very context-
dependence makes experience important for those making the
intervention decisions. Part 1II.D, infra, discusses the costs in greater
detail.
What follows, then, are some of the ways in which financial
crises wreak havoc, and some of the ways regulators can try to limit
their destruction.
72 It is important to note that not all of the tools discussed in this Section
remain in the regulators' toolkits at present. Perhaps most obviously, direct
capital injections would require congressional action, as it did in September
and October of 2008. See Ricks, Regulating Money Creation, supra note 24, at
135. Furthermore, the blanket guarantees that the Treasury Department
provided for the money market fund industry and that the Federl Deposit
Insurance Corpoation provided for uninsured bank debt-neither of which
required congressional action in 2008-would require such action today. See
id. at 132-33 (explaining how legal authorities used to establish the guarantees
for banks and money market funds were removed, respectively, by the Dodd-
Fank Act and the Economic Emergency Stabilization Act).
73 Part III.C, infra, will explain in greater deal why, even if we understand the
basic dynamics of a problem and can articulate guidelines for solving them,
experience is still essential for knowing how to apply the guidelines in




As financial intermediaries suffer losses, their capital position
deteriorates; in other words, they eat through their equity cushion and
risk balance sheet insolvency. In order to rebuild their capital, they may
either raise more equity capital or they may sell assets to pay off
debts-effectively shrinking their balance sheets.74 In a crisis, there are
good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe banks tend more
toward the latter strategy of "asset shrinkage."
75
More generally, weakened financial institutions tend to shy
from new lending, and failed banks, of course, stop lending altogether.
This can significantly damage the economy if other financial
institutions are unable to fill the gap in the near-term, either because
they too are in a process of retrenchment, or because they lack the
sector-specific or geographic expertise to exploit the opening. When a
large number of institutions face this kind of pressure, creditworthy
consumers and job-creating businesses have a harder time getting loans,
exacerbating recessionary dynamics in the real economy.76
The most obvious (and radical) tool to counteract a credit
crunch is to inject capital directly into banks. This is what regulators did
after Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in
October 2008, with its authorization of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program ("TARP"). 77 If far enough ahead of the curve, of course,
74 Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital Regulation, in MAINTAINING
STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 431, 439-40 (2008), available
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2008/KashyapRajanStein.
03.12.09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9BNJ-ZXZP.75See Kashyap et al., supra note 74; Anat R. Admati et al., Debt Overhang and
Capital Regulation 11-13 (Mar. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/defatlt/files/research/documents/
AdmatiDebt032612.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PH6F-NWB9 (examining
the different conditions under which shareholders would have incentives to
increase capital ratios via selling off assets as opposed to raising new equity).
76See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 257, 257 (1983).
77 The Treasury Department's original plan was to purchase troubled assets
from large banks with TARP funds, but this approach was quickly jettisoned
and capital was injected directly into banks instead. See generally John M.
Brandow et al., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, The Capital Twist, in FINANCIAL
CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 67 (2009).
2014-2015
REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW
regulators can try to use regulatory powers78 or moral suasion to force
or encourage financial firms to retain earnings or raise capital in private
markets.
2. Monetary Contraction
Financial institutions often issue very short-term debt that their
claimants hold as part of their "transaction reserve"-i.e., the assets the
claimant uses to meet its near-term transactional needs, whether it be
paying employees or purchasing supplies for a business, or paying rent
and buying groceries in the case of individuals.79 These assets in a
claimant's transaction reserve can either themselves serve as the
medium of exchange, or be exchangeable for the "medium of exchange
immediately at virtually no cost."8 ° In this respect, a financial
institution's short-term debt can sometimes function as the equivalent
of money for those who hold it.8' If an institution's debt is not insured,
its failure would make something that was money-like-highly liquid
and with an extremely stable price-into a non-money-like claim, i.e.,
something much harder to monetize or sell, and with a price that
fluctuates relative to currency.82
Bank failures, then, can lead to a contraction in the money
supply.8 3 The principal cause of the Great Depression is today widely
understood to have been such a monetary contraction, which led to
debilitating deflation.84 The Federal Reserve can counteract monetary
78 The Federal Reserve, for example, can restrict capital distributions by
systemically important financial institutions based on how well they fair in
annual stress tests required under Dodd-Frank. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131101a.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/D2AB-VXCD.
79 See Ricks, Regulating Money Creation, supra note 24, at 91.
80 See id. at 79-80. Think of the difference here between a deposit account with
check-writing privileges, and a savings account without such privileges.
81 See id. at 80.
82 See id. at 127.
13 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
" See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, NAT'L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960,
at 299-419 (1963) (explaining that the Great Depression was caused in large
part by an enormous monetary contraction); see also Ben S. Bernanke,
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., On Milton Friedman's
Ninetieth Birthday (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.
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contraction by pumping money into the system-this is what, for
example, the Federal Reserve's Quantitative Easing has largely aimed
to accomplish.85 This response, however, while necessary, can lead to
other distortions in the real economy.86 While this is not the sort of
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021108/defalt.htm, archived
at http://perma.cc/T9Z9-YXF7 (stating with respect to the Federal Reserve's
failure to counteract monetaiy contraction during the 1930s, "I would like to
say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did
it. We're veiy sory. But thanks to you, we won't do it again."). For a
dissenting view on the role of monetary policy in the Great Depression, see
generally PETER TEMIN, DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE GREAT
DEPRESSION? (1976) (arguing that the causal effect of a fall in aggregate
demand, rather than monetary contraction, has more evidentiary support).
Paul Krugman provides a superb intuitive account of how monetary
forces can affect the level of economic activity in a short essay recounting
problems in a babysitting cooperative for parents who worked on Capitol Hill
in the 1970s. See generally Paul Krugman, Baby-Sitting the Economy, SLATE
(Aug. 14, 1998, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
the dismal science/1998/08/babysitting the economy.single.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/7AX-Y2W5. Krugman explains that the co-op issued "scrip,"
"pieces of paper equivalent to one hour of baby-sitting time," to ensure each
couple gave as much as they received in babysitting services over the long-run.
Id. He then relates that:
[F]or complicated reasons involving the collection and use of dues
(paid in scrip), the number of coupons in circulation became quite
low. As a result, most couples were anxious to add to their reserves
by baby-sitting, reluctant to run them down by going out. But one
couple's decision to go out was another's chance to baby-sit; so it
became difficult to earn coupons. Knowing this, couples became even
more reluctant to use their reserves except on special occasions,
reducing baby-sitting opportunities still further.
In short, the co-op had fallen into a recession.
Id. Of course, in correcting the undersupply of scrip, the co-op eventually faced
a problem of inflation. Id.
85 Quantitative Easing involves the Federal Reserve buying non-traditional
assets, replacing non-money assets with money for private agents. See
generally Lowell R. Ricketts, Quantitative Easing Explained, ECON. INFO.
NEWSL. (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis), Apr. 2011, available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/pageone-economics/uploads/newsletter/2011/
201104.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S7D3-J7U6.
86 The Federal Reserve's actions in pumping money into the economy equate
to driving (and keeping) nominal interest rates low-indeed, this is often seen
as the primary policy objective, with asset purchases serving as the chosen
mechanism. See id. at 1. One problem with this is that "low nominal interest
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intervention that would necessarily be made under extremely tight
deadlines in response to a market on the edge of, or actually in, a state
of panic-the sort of crisis response that is more the focus of this
Article-the potential unintended and undesirable consequences of this
policy lever should inspire regulators to take steps to ensure it is not
necessary.
3. Consequential Losses
Understanding the money-like role of financial institutions'
short-term debt claims permits us to identify another, potentially
significant loss-amplification mechanism. Losses on, or delays in,
redemption for assets held for transactional purposes can create
consequential osses for creditors.87 Not being able to meet the types of
near-term obligations for which we hold transaction reserves may lead
to "opportunity costs, operational disruption, reputational damage, or
even default"88-all costs that are distinct from, and potentially far
outstrip, the "haircut" the depositor may take if a bank cannot meet its
obligations. As Walter Bagehot observed in his great 19th-century study
of banking and financial markets, Lombard Street:
[U]ltimate payment is not what the creditors of a bank
want; they want present, not postponed, payment: they
want to be repaid according to agreement: the contract
was that they should be paid on demand, and if they
are not paid on demand they may be ruined.89
A more modem and colorful illustration of this dynamic is provided by
the British novelist and journalist John Lanchester, describing what
happened after a software update to the payment system at the Royal
rates can create incentives for certain types of investors to take added risk in an
effort to 'reach for yield."' Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Yield-Oriented Investors and the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism 3 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/stein20130926a.pdf, archived at http://perima.cc/UXN4-
L6W6.
87 Ricks, Regulating Money Creation, supra note 24, at 108.
88 Id.
'9 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET 41 (Amo Press Inc. 1979) (1873).
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Bank of Scotland (RBS) made it impossible to make payments into or
withdrawals from RBS accounts for roughly one week in June 2012:
The consequences went from the mild irritation
experienced by people like me who couldn't pay their
credit card bill by the due date, to, at the other end of
the scale, some of the examples mentioned
ungrammatically but vividly on Wikipedia:
'Completion of new home purchases were delayed,
others were stranded abroad, another was threatened
with the discontinuation of their life support machine
in a Mexican hospital, and one man was held in
prison. '9 0
The key to preventing consequential losses from money destruction is,
of course, to prevent money destruction from occurring in the first
place. The most obvious way to do this is to insure money-like
claims-as we do with deposit insurance, or as the FDIC and Treasury
Department did with a vast array of uninsured deposit-like claims
during the cnsis.91
4. Contagion
There are several ways in which panic or instability at one
financial institution may spill over to harm other financial institutions,
exacerbating the three loss-amplifying dynamics outlined above.92
90 John Lanchester, Are We Having Fun Yet?, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, July 4,
2013, at 3, 6.
91 See, e.g., Luigi L. De Ghengi et al., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, The
FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, in FINANCIAL CRISIS
MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 116, 116 (2009).
92 Hal Scott categorizes as "contagion" only what I call below "contagion by
simile"; the other two factors categorized here as "contagiof' he calls
"correlatiof' and "connectedness." Hal S. Scott, How to Improve Five
Important Areas of Financial Regulation, in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 113, 114 (2011),
available at http://www.kauffman.org/-/media/kauffman org/
research%o20reports%/ 20and%/ 20covers/2011/02/rulesforgrowth.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/8JNJ-UGU7. The more common usage, however, seems to
be to refer to any of the three effects as a potential type of contagion. See, e.g.,
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Fire sales. A financial institution facing a run-for example, a
refusal by a large number of its short-term lenders to roll their debt
over-may be forced to meet its obligations by selling assets.9 3 But
there may not be ready buyers immediately available to purchase the
assets for their full value. In order to offload its assets, the institution
may have to engage in "fire sales"-sales of its assets for less than their
"true" value.94 Not only does this harm the seller, but it may have a
damaging effect on other institutions holding similar assets.95 Kashyap
and his coauthors describe the problem as follows:
When bank A adjusts by liquidating assets-e.g., it
may sell off some of its mortgage-backed securities-
it imposes a cost on another bank B who holds the
same assets: The mark-to-market price of B's assets
will be pushed down, putting pressure on B's capital
position and in turn forcing it to liquidate some of its
positions. Thus selling by one bank begets selling by
others, and so on, creating a vicious circle.96
While a fire sale in itself represents a zero-sum transaction-the buyer
gains to the extent that the seller loses with respect to the specific
transaction-the vicious circle weakens the institutions that channel
credit from savers and investors to valuable projects in the real
economy, exacerbating the other loss-amplification mechanisms.
The classic response to the problem of fire sales is for the
government to act as "lender of last resort.,97 The government lends
(against good collateral) so that the firn can repay its private creditors
without having to liquidate its holdings in a depressed market.98 The
Federal Reserve has long had a "discount window" to serve this
function for commercial banks; during the crisis, it extended its lending
Fabio Caccioli et al., Stability Analysis of Financial Contagion Due to
Overlapping Portfolios, 46 J. BANKING & FIN. 233, 233 (2014).
13 See Kashyap et al., supra note 74, at 440-42.
" Scott, supra note 92, at 116-17. "True" value here means the price the asset
would fetch under normal market conditions, without time pressures or serious
information asymmetries.
9' See id.
96 Kashyap et al., supra note 74, at 441.
97 See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of International Swap Lines,




to shadow banks through programs based on Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act, which permits the Fed to lend to non-banks in
"unusual and exigent circumstances.
'" 99
Cascades. 100 The failure of a large financial institution could
weaken its counterparties directly as the failed firm defaults on its
debts. This is often referred to as a "domino" effect, as the failure of
one institution leads, we may fear, to the failure of another, which leads
to another's fall, and so on.'0' Some question this "domino" theory of
contagion, observing that it was a common shock, not a series of
dominos falling, that created problems in the recent crisis. 102 While the
.common shock" theory clearly has force, it also seems highly
plausible that domino-type contagion was not a larger issue precisely
because the government consistently stepped in to keep institutions
from failing. The one time the government let a systemically important
institution fail-Lehman Brothers-it led to Reserve Primary, a $64
billion money market mutual fund, "breaking the buck" due to direct
counterparty losses, forcing its failure and leading to a run on the entire
money market fund industry-a potential catastrophe which, absent
dramatic government intervention, could have led to economic damage
orders of magnitude greater than what we saw.
103
The most obvious interventions in 2008 aimed squarely at
forestalling this type of domino-style contagion were the bailouts of
" See, e.g., Randall D. Guynn et al., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Federal
Reserve Emergency Intervention Authority: Old Tools Used in New Ways, in
FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 18, 20-21 (2009).
100 The tem "cascades" is borrowed from ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN
RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 98-112 (1997), reprinted
in RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 732-36 (4th ed. 2009).
101 See id. at 733.
... See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, Op. Ed., Dodd-Frank and the Myth of
'Interconnectedness', WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2012, at A15.
113 For an excellent account of Reserve Primary's implosion following
Lehman's bankruptcy, see generally James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle
to Save the American Financial System, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 58.
Reserve Primary, as a money market fund, issued "shares" that were worth $1
each. Id. at 69. The "shares" were seen as a close substitute for bank deposits,
however, and "breaking the buck," so that the value of each share falls below
$1, is analogous to bank depositors receiving less than $1 for each dollar they
deposited with the bank. Id.
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Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG. 1 4 The number of counterparties
with direct exposure to each of these firms was staggering and included
most major Wall Street firms.
10 5
Contagion by Simile. After Reserve Primary broke the buck, a
general run began on the money market fund industry, illustrating
another potential type of contagion: one based on asymmetric
information, where short-term creditors of the sister institutions of a
failed fund or firm, with no risk tolerance for even tiny haircuts or
delays in getting their money back, withdraw their money
preemptively, due to a concern that the sister institution may be like the
failed institution.1°6 This can occur even if the firm is otherwise
sound-either because the firm is unable to credibly communicate its
soundness to creditors (asymmetric information), or because creditors
fear that other creditors may run.10 7 The run on money market funds
during the days after Reserve Primary broke the buck provides a classic
example of this type of contagion. For example, a $12 billion money
market fund run by Putnam was liquidated despite being solvent and
having no exposure to either Lehman Brothers or Reserve Primary. 1
08
This type of contagion also motivated Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd
Blankfein's concern for Morgan Stanley's health during the same
104 For the terms of the government's capital injection in Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, see generally Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dept. Office of Pub.
Affairs, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
(Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/pspa f ctsheet 090708/o20hpl 128.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/F9QV-5CYK. For the terms of the government's capital
injections into AIG, see Guynn et al., supra note 99, at 28-32.
105 See, e.g., PAULSON, supra note 69, at 4 ("[T]he collapse of Fannie and
Freddie would be catastrophic. Seemingly everyone in the world-little banks,
big banks, foreign central banks, money market funds-owned their paper or
was a counterparty."); see also id. at 218 ("[A]n AIG bankruptcy would be
devastating, leading to the failure of many other institutions.").
106 See, e.g., GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 69 ("The overconfidence that fuels
bubbles can become panic when bubbles pop, as investors who thought certain
types of investments were perfectly safe suddenly decide that nothing that even
resembles those investments is safe. Markets stop discriminating among loans,
among banks, among countries.").
107 Again, the possibility of a run as a self-fulfilling prophecy was modeled by
Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 33.
108 See Stewart, supra note 103, at 73.
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period-duing a call to Morgan Stanley CEO John Mack, he told him,
'You have to hang on..., because I'm thirty seconds behind you.-
1" 0 9
Perhaps the most important intervention to stop this type of
contagion during the crisis was the move by Paulson and his team to
provide a blanket guarantee to the entire money market industry."l
0
5. Other Tools
As emphasized above, the interventions outlined here are
illustrative, not exhaustive. Other (non-exhaustive) responses might
include asset purchases, facilitating or backstopping sales, and, notably,
winding down an institution so as to minimize follow-on contagion and
losses, as with the OLA under Title II of Dodd-Frank. To illustrate
further the complexity of the sorts of decisions regulators face, it is also
possible to conceive of a situation in which markets are just strong
enough to bear the failure of a key institution, and this failure is
precisely what is needed to motivate other institutional decision makers
to strengthen their capital positions. Indeed, as Tim Geithner, no enemy
of muscular intervention to stop a crisis, observes, "[a] central bank
overreaction can even backfire right away, feeding instead of easing
concern. Markets sometimes conclude a situation must be dire if
policymakers act like it's dire.""'
C. Importance of Experience
Doing more good than harm in perceiving these dynamics and
deciding whether and how to intervene demands an expertise born of
experience (what Kahneman and Klein called "skilled intuition"l
2).
109 ANDREW Ross SORKiN, Too BIG TO FAIL 448 (2009).
110 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Tempomry Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008),
available at http ://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
hpl 161 .aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/5PXM-XNA4.
. GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 120 (arguing further that "[o]ften it's better to
stand back, as we had done in September 2006, when bad bets on natural gas
futures sank a giant hedge fund called Amaranth Advisors. That looked like a
one-off, an idiosyncratic casualty of bad risk management, unlikely to light the
rest of the financial system on fire. And it was.").
112 See generally Kahneman & Klein, supra note 56. "Intuition," in this sense,
means the direct apprehension of the truth without any conscious reasoning;
because it is rooted in experience, there is nothing magic in it. For an
influential formulation of this, see Herbert A. Simon, What Is an
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The relevance of crisis-fighting experience to financial regulators may
seem intuitively obvious to the reader. But why, precisely, is experience
important? Why wouldn't it do as well to develop comprehensive
crisis-fighting guidelines and ensure that new regulators have read
them? The answer, of course, is that applying valid guidelines in
complex situations is not always (or usually) straightforward.
Returning to Kahneman and Klein's example of fireground
commanders:113 as commanders gain experience and build their
repertoire, they may not-indeed, often will not-be able to articulate
precisely why they chose one course of action rather than another.
114
Even if they can provide a contextualized reason for a particular
decision, it may be a fool's errand to try to generalize this into an
articulable rule that can reliably keep the studious novice out of trouble.
The likely futility of such an effort is captured well by a study
of Canada's Emergency Response Teams ("ERTs")-the equivalent of
police SWAT teams in the United States.115 The procedures for ERT
missions were extensively documented and were supposed to be
followed rigorously.116 The study authors slowly discovered, however,
how partial a picture of the teams' work this proceduralism provided.
For example,
[The teams'] training and procedure dictate that team
members enter a building in formation and clear every
room, starting with the ground floor and working up.
However, if the operation takes place at 3:00 a.m., the
chances are high that the suspect will be sleeping in
the master bedroom. One ERT commander put it this
"Explanation" of Behavior?, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 150, 155 (1992) ("The situation
has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to information stored in
memoy, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more
and nothing less than recognition.") (emphasis added).
113 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
114 See Kahneman and Klein, supra note 56, at 516.
15 KLEIN, supra note 47, at 40-41 (citing Danyele Harris-Thompson &
Sterling L. Wiggins, When SOP Is Not Enough, L. OFFICER MAG., May 2007,
available at http://www.lawofficer.com/article/magazine-feature/when-sop-
not-enough, archived at http://perma.cc/7NAM-ZQNA).
116 Id. at 40 ("The senior ERT leaders explained that they had worked out clear
procedures for just about everything they did-how they approached a house
or building, how they entered it, how they systematically cleared it. Eveything
was proceduralized, everyone knew the procedures, and eveiyone depended on
eveiyone else to follow the procedures.").
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way: "If we clear all the rooms, by the time we get to
the second floor and the bedroom, we've been in the
house for two minutes ... the target is awake. Now
we're putting ourselves in harm's way and
compromising the mission. Therefore, we'll go
directly to the master bedroom after breaching instead
of procedurally clearing every room first."
'"17
Surely, one might think, properly fleshed out procedures would take
account of such a situation. The ERT manual could direct team
members to go straight to the bedroom if the raid comes at night-but
then "what if there is a light coming from the kitchen? Or what if they
hear a door closing to a downstairs bathroom as they are getting ready
to rush up the stairs?""" One can, of course, spin out infinite variations
on this theme. Writing a complete set of procedures in situations such
as this evokes the difficulty in various contexts of writing a complete
contract. 119
In the end, one must rely on experts' "perceptual
discriminations" and ability to "interpret, modify, and replace the
standard procedures when they don't work."'120 These skills can be
honed through actor's being forced to apply the guidelines-and thus to
see how well they work or do not work-in a large number of different
contexts; in other words, through experience.121
To provide an example in the context of financial crises, one of
the most famous rules for preventing needless economic destruction
resulting from a market panic is "[Walter] Bagehot's famous dictum"
that in a financial crisis "central banks should lend early and freely (ie
[sic] without limit), to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at
'high rates. "1 22 This is equivalent to the "lender of last resort" function
117 Id.
118 Id. at 40-41.
119 The infeasibility of a complete contract justifies courts' implying
contractual tens ex post; the analogue here is the expert's ability
(automatically) to imply the correct move and act on it in situations not
anticipated by the explicit standard operating procedures. See Jody S. Kraus &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009).
121 KLEIN, supra note 52, at 41.
121 See id.
122 Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The repertoire
of official sector interventions in the financial system-last resort lending,
market-making, and capital 3, (May 28, 2009), available at
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described above as a response to the problem of fire sales.12 3 As Gary
Gorton points out, however, this hardly provides a bright-line rule for
conduct:
First, when is there a 'crisis'? And furthermore, in a
crisis, what is a 'solvent' firm, what is 'good'
collateral, what is a 'high rate'? These are judgment
calls that the central bank must make, and make
quickly. It is hard to see how the answers to these
questions could be prespecified as rules. And if they
could, these rules would likely not be followed in the
• • 124next crisis.
In many ways, of course, this should call to mind (for the lawyer, at
least) the classic distinction between rules and standards.125 While
financial regulation must incorporate both rules (such as minimum
capital ratios)126 and standards (such as the designation of "systemically
important" non-banks under the Dodd-Frank Act),127 in a crisis, with its
unpredictable and constantly changing dynamics, we must increase our
reliance on standards. Perhaps the most important standard, which
should guide all regulator action in a crisis, yet is infinitely complex in
application, is summed up best by former Federal Reserve Board of
Governors member Frederic Mishkin: "you want to be tough, as long as
you don't blow up the system.'28
http://www.bis.org/review/09O6O8c.pdf?frames=0, archived at http://perma.
cc/Y6NU-AQPD; see also BAGEHOT, supra note 89, at 187-88.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
124 GORTON, supra note 38, at 196.
125 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
126 E.g., Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act § 115,
12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2012).
127 See Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Refonn Act § 113,
12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
128 David Wessel, Lessons of the Rescue: A Drama in Five Acts, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2013, at Al; see also GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 517 (asserting much
the same point as Mishkin, but from the opposite direction stating, "Ideally,
you want to provide just enough liquidity and other support for the system to
prevent it from falling apart, but not so much that you sustain unsalvageable
firms or unsustainable asset prices.").
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D. Effective Intervention in a Complex Environment
There are a number of factors that prevent the sorts of
interventions discussed in Part II.B, supra, from being straightforward
or easy to apply. Above all, there is the tension inherent in Mishkin's
dictum ("to be tough" without "blow[ing] up the system").129 Keeping
the system from blowing up-namely by forestalling the loss
propagation mechanisms described above-often involves protecting
market actors from losses that they would otherwise suffer in the
absence of government intervention. If market actors believe they will
be protected from losses, they are less likely to take pains to avoid
losses-particularly when the risk of loss goes hand-in-hand with the
possibility of higher profits if things go well.13
0
In other words, saving the system can exacerbate moral
hazard, potentially increasing the risk of future (larger) losses and
instability in the system.131 Over the long term, there is also tension
between promoting growth and promoting stability-for example, in
the capital levels imposed on institutions.132 Given the scope of this
Article, we will limit our focus here to the regulator's role once crisis-
like dynamics are in play, when the overriding but not sole goal must
be to avoid "blow[ing] up the system"-i.e., panic and a system-wide
129 Wessel, supra note 128.
130 This trade-off between risk and reward is, of course, a cornerstone of
modem finance theory. To grasp the principle intuitively, consider that the
yield on a 'junk" bond will invariably be much higher than the yield on a U.S.
Treasury bond, but the risk of default is also (invariably) much higher. See
SEC. EXCH. COMM'N OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC PUB.
No. 150, WHAT ARE HIGH-YIELD CORPORATE BONDS? 1 (June 1, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib high-yield.pdf, archived at
http://perima.cc/3KQK-H7XD.
131 It is worth noting that depositors and other money claimants (e.g., repo
lenders) are typically veiy inefficient monitors and market disciplinarians until
things reach a tipping point, at which point their method of discipline-i.e.,
nmning-creates the potentially catastrophic negative externalities that we so
desperately wish to avoid. See, e.g., David Min, Understanding the Failures of
Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3),
available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2403988##
(challenging the relevance of market discipline for financial finns).
112 See, e.g., John Crawford, The Battle over Bank Capital: Determinants of An
Optimal Regulatory Approach, 66 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2404994.
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withdrawal of short-term funding.133 Even as this goal dominates
regulators' concerns, it must still be balanced with the subsidiary goals
of managing political risk (e.g., avoiding a backlash against bailouts
that ties regulators' hands and makes a system-wide blow-up likelier)
and (relatedly) not permitting moral hazard to metastasize going
forward. Mishkin's dictum is easy to state, but extremely difficult to
apply well in practice.
A further challenge to effective intervention is that it is not
always perfectly clear when the dynamics will reach, or have already
reached, crisis level.134 Many did not guess that housing price declines
would reverberate as they did. 135 Resolving a problem bank too early
could be needlessly disruptive and possibly spark market jitters that
harm otherwise sound banks (contagion by simile); 136 waiting too long
(e.g., by exercising "regulatory forbearance")137 could allow firms to
deepen their balance sheet holes-and the cost of the ultimate
reckoning-by "gambling for resurrection.',
138
Even when there is consensus that crisis-like dynamics are at
play, it is not always clear how much the crisis is driven by
fundamental insolvency as opposed to illiquidity. 139 Of course, one type
of crisis might easily morph into the other: for example, a solvent firm
that has to engage in fire sales in order to manage a liquidity squeeze
133 Wessel, supra note 128.
131 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
135 The release of transcripts from the Fed's meetings in 2008 provide a rare
glimpse into the degree regulators were trying to make sense-with varying
levels of success-of the (first slowly, then rapidly) developing crisis. See, e.g.,
Jon Hilsenrath, New View Into Fed's Response To Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21,
2014, at Al (discussing how Federal Reserve officials "spent much of the
spring and summer [of 2008] hamstrung by uncertainty, disagreement and an
unexpected inflation jump," and how two days after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke said, concerning the Fed's
interest rate policy, "I think that our policy is looking actually pretty good.").
136 See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
137 See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach to Systemic Risk and
Too-Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 301 (2012).
13' ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 43 (2013)
(explaining that when a company is insolvent its shareholders may wish to see
the company make bets that have a negative expected net present value, as long
as the upside in the event the bets pay off will put the shareholders back in the
black).
139 See id. at 32.
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may become insolvent (as it gets less for its assets than they were
"really" worth).140 More generally, if the government does not
intervene effectively in a liquidity crisis and the financial system
collapses as a result, then depression would ensue, businesses would
collapse, people would lose their jobs, and a raft of consumer and
business credit defaults would lead to an insolvency crisis. One of the
fiercest intra-administration fights at the beginning of President
Obama's first term was over the strategy pushed by Tim Geithner, in
his new role as Treasury Secretary, to subject large financial institutions
to "stress test[s].' 14 1 The tests would be used to gauge whether
institutions had sufficient capital buffers to withstand further adverse
shocks. 142 Those firms deemed to have insufficient capital would have
to make up their capital shortfall either by raising funds from private
investors or by accepting an investment (with generally unfavorable
terms for the bank) from the government. 143 Geithner, who had a hunch
banks were not quite as bad off as many believed, thought the tests
might provide a chance for markets to regain confidence and inject
capital into the banks again.44 Geithner's erstwhile mentor and
President Obama's new director of the National Economic Council,
Larry Summers, believed that the banks were in much worse condition,
that more drastic action (such as nationalization) was necessary, and
that stress tests would only extend the pain.45 Geithner's plan won out
and he was ultimately vindicated as every single financial institution
either passed the test or was able to raise the required funds in private
markets,146 but the fact that some of the economy's and markets' most
sophisticated observers feared more intractable insolvency problems
points to the difficulty of interpreting data in real time, in the "fog of
war.
A possible but ultimately incomplete response to the concern
about the opacity with which regulators must struggle in responding to
140 See id.
141 GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 286-89.
142 Id. at 286.
143 Id. at 287.
144 Id. at 286-87.
15 Id. at 288 ("Lany worried that the stress test would be viewed as a
whitewash, a mechanism to prop up zombie banks."); id. at 321. ("His
recurrent theme was that our plan was too reminiscent of Japan, which had
kept its zombie banks alive and suffered the consequences of its timidity, and
not enough like Sweden, which had nationalized banks and enjoyed a buoyant
recovery.").
146 See, e.g., Brandow et al., supra note 77, at 68.
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a crisis in real time is that more disclosure and better information might
be able to dissipate the fog. While the lack of good data was a glaring
problem in the recent crisis, and continues to be a major concern,147
there are reasons to be skeptical that more data and more information-
as important as they may be-can solve all our problems. Klein argues
persuasively that sufficient information was available to predict a
number of traumatic crises prior to their occurrence, if policy-makers
had been appropriately focused on it, or if the system had had better
filters. 148 He highlights in this vein intelligence that could or should
have provided U.S. policymakers with advance notice of the 9/11
attacks and the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as early public
disclosures that should have alerted securities regulators to the
accounting shenanigans at Enron.149 At a certain point, decision
makers' ability to make sense of data becomes much more important
than the addition of any new data: "There is no point," Klein observes,
"at which enough data will magically coalesce and produce meaning.
People have to make sense of the details.'150 A useful metaphor for
"mak[ing] sense" of information is "connecting the dots.'' Models
show us how to connect the dots, but experience is essential for
recognizing in complex situations "what counts as a dot,"'152 and in
helping us recognize which dots are needed to complete a given
153
picture.
A third reason it may be difficult to apply guidelines in a
straightforward manner is the degree to which crisis response invites
147 See, e.g., Andrew Haldane, Towards a common financial language 1 (Mar.
14, 2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Documents/speeches/2012/speech552.pdf, archived at http://penua.cc/YL25-
9TF6 (comparing the lack of a common language in the financial system, and
thus the difficulty of integrating and communicating key data and information,
to the biblical punishment of those building the Tower of Babel).
... KLEIN, supra note 52, at 136-43.
149 Id.; see generally Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence,
and the Perils of Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007, at 44
(making a similar argument with respect o Enron).
151 KLEIN, supra note 52, at 135.
151 Id. at 127.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 Id. at 184 ("[WIlhen we make sense of events we usually are seeing only
some of the dots that complete the picture, trying to remember others,
discarding 'wannabe' dots, and adjusting dots that have gotten distorted.").
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withering political scrutiny.154 This is in part because of what Gary
Gorton calls the "paradox of financial crises": in a systemic crisis,
"'what feels just and fair is the opposite of what's required for a just
and fair outcome.""55 Even if one accepts this paradox as true,
however, it is important to acknowledge that crisis management
necessarily involves some degree of "picking" winners and losers.1
5 6
This makes crisis intervention especially politically fraught.5 7 The
Lehman scenario laid out in the next section provides a vivid example
of how deeply crisis management affects and is affected by the political
backdrop.
A fourth challenge to effective crisis response is the possibility
of strategic behavior by key actors in the political and financial system.
This, again, played a central role in the decisions leading up to
Lehman's failure, as the next Part will make clear.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that effective cnisis
management is as much about anticipating and being prepared to
counter the negative fallout of key actions or omissions as it is about
154 A persistent theme of the memoirs borne of the financial crisis is the
toxicity of the politics surrounding crisis response. For example, after
describing his work on the Treasury Department's response to Mexico's "peso
crisis" of 1994, Tim Geithner writes that by late 1995,
Mexico had fallen out of the news, and neither the success of the
rescue nor the fact that we recovered our investments plus a profit got
much attention-certainly not enough to offset the political hit that
Clinton and Rubin took around the initial decision.
Mexico was a bracing lesson in the terrible politics of crisis
response. I had never worked on something so controversial before,
and it was searing to watch the abuse showered on Rubin and
Greenspan-then ear the peak of their public credibility-for taking
a risk that seemed so compelling to me.
GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 51.
155 GORTON, supra note 38, at 166 (quoting Timothy Geithner).
156 For example, while one can tell compelling (and tme) stories based on
regulators' and politicians' understanding of the urgency of the moment as to
why (to pick two examples) Bear Steams was "saved" but Lehman was left to
bankmptcy, or why the uninsured creditors of Washington Mutual did not
receive full recoveries but the uninsured creditors of Wachovia did, this is
unlikely to assuage the "losers" in these cases. For an analysis of the Crisis
with a focus on the political aspects of regulators' response to it, see generally,
e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation
of Financial Politics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991 (2014) (book review).
157 See GORTON, supra note 38, at 166.
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making the decision that ex post appears right in every case. Once
again, the Lehman saga provides a perfect illustration of this.
E. Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in the Challenges
of Effective Intervention
When Lehman Brothers, the venerable investment bank, filed
for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the fallout was terrifying. 158 In
terms of the mechanisms outlined in Part Il.B, Lehman's failure led to
the destruction of money claims and consequential losses,159 as well as
contagion by cascade and contagion by simile.160 As James Stewart
recounts in his 2009 New Yorker article about the days surrounding the
beginning the crisis:
The [anonymous] Treasury official described the
situation: "Lehman Brothers begat the Reserve
[Primary] collapse, which begat the money-market
run, so the money-market funds wouldn't buy
commercial paper. The commercial-paper market was
on the brink of destruction. At this point, the banking
system stops functioning. You're pulling four trillion
out of the private sector"-money-market funds-
"and giving it to the government in the form of T-bills.
That was commercial paper funding GE, Citigroup,
FedEx, all the commercial-paper issuers. This was
151 See, e.g., Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al.
159 The most salient example is, of course, Reserve Primary's failure: it held
Lehman securities it believed to be (almost as) liquid and price-protected as
money; when these claims became non-money-like (i.e., illiquid and highly
volatile claims on the Lehman estate), it led to the destruction of the immense
and venerable money market fund. See generally Stewart, supra note 103.
16' Reserve Primaly's insolvency was the result of direct losses on its
investment in Lehman's securities; the failure of Lehman in turn exacerbated a
run on Morgan Stanley, not because of Morgan Stanley's exposure to Lehman,
but because it was seen as "like" Lehman in tenns of its vulnerabilities. On the
liquidity problems of Morgan Stanley during the days leading up to and
following Lehman's failure, see Darrell Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial
System: Uneven Progress, INT'L J. CENTRAL BANKING, Jan. 2013, at 251, 276
fig. 13 (showing the "[s]ources of [loss to Morgan Stanley's [liquidity [p]ool,
[from] September 10-22, 2008").
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systemic risk. Suddenly, you have a global bank
holiday.''
The lead-up to Lehman's collapse has been chronicled elsewhere in
great detail,162 but a very brief outline of certain key events and
decisions will help frame and amplify several of the key points made in
Section III.D-namely the difficulty of responding to a crisis when one
has conflicting objectives; the political challenge of crisis intervention;
the central role of strategic behavior; and the importance of regulators
anticipating and preparing for potential bad outcomes from
interventions or failures to intervene.
Lehman Brothers had been on regulators' radar throughout the
summer of 2008 as a potential source of trouble, and by early
September it was on the verge of failing. 163 Creditors were rapidly
losing confidence in Lehman and were withdrawing funding; by
Friday, September 12, it was clear that without a drastic third-party
intervention, Lehman would not be able to meet all its obligations on
Monday and would fail. 16 4 Regulators hoped to persuade a stronger
financial firm to buy Lehman over the weekend, so that creditors would
regain confidence and roll over their debt.165 The problem, however,
was that Lehman was sitting on losses large enough that no firm was
willing to pay a positive price for the firm. 166 The Fed had solved a
similar problem when Bear Steams had been sold to J.P. Morgan six
months earlier by assuming the risk of losses on roughly $30 billion of
Bear's bad assets.167 Political and public sentiment had, however,
turned sharply against bailouts. 168 Just days before, the government had
placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into receivership, and injected
enough capital into the two government-sponsored entities to ensure
creditors would not suffer losses.169 As James Stewart recounts in his
161 Stewart, supra note 103, at 73.
162 See, e.g., PAULSON, supra note 69, at 122-221; SORKIN, supra note 109.
163 See PAULSON, supra note 69, at 122-221.
164 See id. at 186-92.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 181-82.
167 GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 156; Guynn et al., supra note 99, at 26.
168 Stewart, supra note 103, at 80.
169 PAULSON, supra note 69, at 3 ("But Fannie and Freddie were
congressionally chartered companies that already relied heavily on implicit
government support, and in August, along with Bernanke, I'd come to the
conclusion that taking them over was the best way to avert a meltdown, keep
mortgage financing available, stabilize markets, and protect the taxpayer.").
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New Yorker article, "Public criticism of Paulson and Bemanke was
scathing. The bailouts had brought into rare alignment the Republican
right wing, averse to any tampering with the free market, and the
Democratic left, outraged by the government rescue of Wall Street's
overpaid 6lite.' 170 Paulson recounts in his memoirs calls from
Congressional eaders warning him against putting taxpayer money on
the line; Senator Chris Dodd, for example, told him, '[the President
and CFO of Lehman Brothers, Richard] Fuld is a friend. Try to help,
but don't bail Lehman out."
17 1
It was against this anti-bailout backdrop that Paulson and his
team sought plausible buyers of Lehman.172 There were two heading
into the weekend: Bank of America and Barclays, a British bank.
173
Bank of America's CEO, Ken Lewis, insisted on getting a "Jamie
deal," after the arrangement J.P. Morgan chief Jamie Dimon negotiated
in March for the Bear Steams purchase.174 He wanted to leave the
"bad" assets behind, with losses to be assumed by the government.175
Paulson was adamant in communicating to Lewis and to everyone else
that no public money would be used to support the deal, in line with the
intense political pressure being brought to bear on him. 176 Despite
Paulson's efforts to assure Lewis that he would try to come up with a
solution for the bad assets that involved a private, rather than a public,
bailout, 177 Lewis moved on from Lehman and set his sights on its
slightly less weak rival, Merrill Lynch. 17 Thus, only Barclays was left
in play to buy Lehman. Paulson and other top regulators, continuing to
insist that no public money could be committed to support a deal, were
170 Stewart, supra note 103, at 60.
171 PAULSON, supra note 69, at 181.
172 See id. at 122-221.
173 Id. at 192.
174 SORKIN, supra note 109, at 278-79 ("'We've looked into it and we can't do
it-we can't do it without government assistance,' Lewis said levelly.").175 Id. at 279.
176 GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 178 ("All week long, Hank had stuck to a
consistent message in his private calls to the market: The government will not
subsidize the purchase of Lehman.").
177 SORKIN, supra note 109, at 279 (reporting that after Paulson told Lewis he
would try to get Lewis the protection he needed from the private sector, "Lewis
paused, not at all pleased with what Paulson seemed to be suggesting. He
didn't want to get involved in a quasi-public-private rescue; he wanted a
'Jamie deal.' And he knew full well that his rivals were unlikely to want to foot
the bill so he could buy Lehman for a song.").
178 Id. at 322-23.
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(quite remarkably) able to persuade and cajole the other major Wall
Street chiefs to agree to fund a vehicle to hold Lehman's most toxic
assets, accepting the (high) risk of loss on these assets. 179 It seemed like
a deal was in the offing and Lehman would be saved.'80 Alas, Barclays'
regulators in the United Kingdom, refused to greenlight the deal.'
8'
With no buyer and no time, Lehman was forced to file for
bankruptcy. 1
82
179 PAULSON, supra note 69, at 210 ("In the end, they had come much further
than Tim and I thought they would. They had agreed to put up more than $30
billion to save their rival, and they had figured out how to spread the risk
across the industry.").
S0 ee id.
181 Id. at 210-11. Paulson admits to misreading the tea leaves heading into the
weekend. Specifically, he ignored a vague warning from Alastair Darling,
Chancellor of the United Kingdom Exchequer, that the British were not
enthusiastic about Barclays as a buyer for Lehman. Id. at 187-88 ("Afterward I
commented to Jim Wilkinson that Alistair seemed to be telling me that the
British didn't want their banks to catch the American disease. But because he
couched this as a general concern, I didn't see his words as the red flag that in
retrospect hey appear to have been.").
182 Paulson, Bemanke, and Geithner all insist that they had no legal authority to
rescue Lehman. See Phillip Swagel, Why Lehman Wasn't Rescued, N.Y. TIMES
ECONOMIX (Sept. 13, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/09/13/why-lehman-wasnt-rescued/?php=tme&_type=blogs& r=O,
archived at http://perma.cc/99QX-A6Q8. Some commentators question their
insistence, believing they could in fact have saved Lehman, even after all the
other chips had fallen by the afternoon of Sunday, September 14. There are
two measures critics appear to assume the Federal Reserve and/or Treasury
could have undertaken. First, they assume they could have injected capital into
Lehman Brothers, as they ultimately did with General Motors and Chrysler,
and with Citigroup and Bank of America, and a host of other financial
institutions. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 277
(2009) ("If they could lawfully bail out insolvent auto manufacturers, they
could lawfully have bailed out an insolvent investment bank."). But all these
capital injections were carried out under the aegis of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), which was not authorized by Congress until the enactment
of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on October 3, 2008, eighteen
days after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. See Swagel, supra. Second,
they argue that the Federal Reserve could have lent to Lehman under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which permits collateralized lending to non-
bank institutions in "unusual and exigent circumstances." See supra text
accompanying note 100. This is what the Federal Reserve had used to backstop
the sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan in March 2008, what underlay several
broader-based liquidity facilities the Fed made available to broker-dealers
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This tragic story illustrates the tension between being tough
and saving the system. According to all credible accounts, top financial
regulators desperately wanted for Lehman to survive, but they wanted
almost as much to avoid putting taxpayer money into it. 183 Again, the
pressure on top financial regulators not to bail out Lehman Brothers
was extraordinary. 184 In the two days after news that Lehman would file
for bankruptcy became public, the Wall Street Journal and the New
York Times, whose editorial boards can generally be expected to take
opposite sides of any given issue, both published laudatory editorials. 185
Despite all this, Paulson claims that if there had been a legal
way to put government money into Lehman to save it, he would have
done it rather than let it file for bankruptcy.16 So what happened?
Here the centrality of strategic behavior comes into focus.
Regulators' order of preferences heading into the Lehman weekend
appears to have been as follows: (1) to facilitate a sale without public
money; (2) to facilitate a sale with public money (by, e.g., assuming the
risk of loss on bad assets); and (3) to allow Lehman to file for
starting in March 2008, and what the Fed relied on in bailing out AIG. See
Guynn et al., supra note 99, at 18. The key distinction between Bear and
Lehman is that in the latter case there was no private buyer; and the key
distinction between Lehman and AIG is that AIG's problem was seen as one of
liquidity mther than solvency, whereas Lehman was deemed to have a deep
capital hole, and no one could quite see to the bottom of it. See PAULSON,
supra note 69, at 208, 229. ("[U]nlike with Bear Sterns, the Fed's hands were
tied [with Lehman] because we had no buyer.... Unlike with Lehman, the Fed
felt it could make a loan to help AIG because we were dealing with a liquidity,
not a capital, problem.").
113 See, e.g., GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 178-79.
... See id. at 178 ("[A]fter [the bailouts of] Bear and Fannie and Freddie,
Washington had become a cauldron of Old Testament populism and moal
hazard fundamentalism.").
185 Editorial, Wall Street Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A28 ("It is
oddly reassuring that the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve let
Lehman Brothers fail .... [B]arring the risk of cascading failures, regulators
finally seem willing to hold Wall Street accountable for its mistakes.");
Editorial, Wall Street Reckoning, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A22. (" [T]he
government had to draw the line somewhere .... Secretary Hank Paulson's
refusal to blink won't get any second guessing from us.").
186 See Stewart, supra note 103, at 63 ("Paulson now acknowledges... that the
government was more amenable to funding a rescue than it let on. 'We said,
'No public money,' ... 'We said this publicly. We repeated it when these guys
came in. But to ourselves we said, 'If there's a chance to put in public money
and avert a disaster, we're open to it."").
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bankruptcy. In order to try to achieve regulators' first preference,
Paulson had to bend over backwards to signal that his third preferred
outcome dominated his second preferred outcome-this is the only way
that could have motivated the Wall Street chiefs to agree to absorb
losses in the wake of a sale.187 In doing so, however, he drove away
Bank of America.'88 If Paulson had been able to credibly promise
Lewis that he would be able to leave Lehman's most toxic assets
behind in buying the firm-with losses to be bome hopefully by other
private banks, but if not, then by the government-he likely could have
avoided outcome (3), but he also would have thereby made outcome (1)
impossibly difficult to achieve, as the other Wall Street banks would
have been far more resistant to funding a vehicle with Lehman's worst
assets if they knew the government would fill the role in extremis.189
Despite the devastating fallout from Lehman's failure, it is not
clear that regulators made the wrong choices that weekend from an ex
ante perspective. First, the nature of complex systems is such that even
the best moves sometimes fail due to bad luck. Second, the financial
environment was such that a Lehman bailout may not have ended the
bleeding-the "sharks" may have next turned their attention to Merrill
Lynch if Bank of America was busy trying to digest Lehman, and a
similar game would have played out a week later. Indeed, given the
weaknesses in financial markets, as well as the intensely anti-bailout
political environment of the moment, it is not clear even from an ex
post perspective that putting public money on the line would have been
preferable to failure. It is possible, on the contrary, that Lehman was a
necessary sacrifice in order for the public and key lawmakers to
support, or at least condone, the extraordinary steps that were needed-
and might have eventually been needed regardless of Lehman-to
stabilize the system. Tim Geithner recounts a conversation he had with
Barney Frank as the destruction of Lehman's failure was becoming
clear: "If nothing else, [Frank] mused, the terror of the free fall could
dampen enthusiasm for government inaction, and shock the political
world into taking the crisis seriously. 'Maybe this will shut up the
crazies,' he said."'190
It is easy to imagine a scenario, then, in which saving Lehman
would have made it much more difficult to take these steps, and the
destructive dynamics playing out in the financial system would have
187 See GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 178.
188 SORKIN, supra note 109, at 279.
189 See id.
190 GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 192.
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had more time to wreak their havoc before they could finally and
effectively be quashed. This counterfactual is, of course, highly
speculative. Returning to the most straightforward defense of
regulators' decisions that weekend: the fact that in complex
environments the "right"'191 choices can sometimes have bad outcomes
demonstrates not that expertise is irrelevant but rather the importance of
having regulators who can anticipate, and therefore be prepared to
respond to, the (always possible) worst-case outcome.
Regulators may not have been prepared for the terrible
consequences of Lehman, but they adjusted quickly and engaged in a
breathtaking range of actions to save the system in the days, weeks, and
months following the bank's collapse. These included many of the
interventions described in Part Il.B, supra, including guaranteeing
money market fund accounts, guaranteeing all bank debt, asking for
and facilitating the enactment of the EESA and TARP, injecting capital
into banks, and bailing out and taking over AIG.
192
While wargame design will be discussed in more detail in Part
IVA, infra, it is worth pausing here to consider some of the lessons
relevant to such design that may be drawn from the Lehman saga. First,
the Lehman story suggests that, to the extent possible, simulations
should incorporate potentially adverse political conditions into the
decision-making calculus participants face. Second, close case studies
of specific crisis incidents may be worth combining with (extensive)
research of current market institutional arrangements in designing
games. Finally, wargames should provide regulators experience in
trying to recover from catastrophic decisions, as well as experience in
trying to avoid them.
As I argue in Part IV, infra, while it is unlikely a Lehman-like
situation would play out in precisely the same way during the next
crisis, having lived through it-or simulated variations of it-can help
191 "Right" here is not used in any absolute sense but rather "means a decision
the likely outcome of which has envisioned benefits for the decision maker."
Robert C. Rubel, The Epistemology of War Gaming, NAVAL WAR C. REV.,
Spring 2006, at 108, 127 n.5. Rubel continues, "Clearly, even 'right' decisions
could result in failure due to bad luck (statistically speaking) or the intervention
of imponderable factors." Id.; see also GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 46 (citing
former Secretary Treasury Robert Rubin's admonition that "[Y]ou can't judge
a decision by how it turns out, only by whether it made sense given the
information available at the time.").
192 See generally DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS




prepare regulators to better anticipate potentially adverse consequences
from decisions on whether to intervene in a crisis, to integrate
consideration of the risk of such consequences quickly into the
decision-making process, and to think through provisional steps to
address possible vicious side effects arising from any particular
regulatory act or omission.
F. Regulator Experience and the 2008 Crisis
Regulators clearly made mistakes in responding to the crisis,19
but I accept the view that regulators' actions post-Lehman saved us
from a second Great Depression.194 It may be worth noting here that
some of our top regulators did in fact have some relevant experience
with crisis-like conditions prior to 2007-08. In particular, Tim Geithner,
at the time head of the New York Fed, had been one of the top deputies
193 If letting Lehman fail was not a mistake, then failing to recognize at an
earlier date the magnitude of the crisis certainly was. See, e.g., Hilsenrath,
supra note 135 ("Two days after U.S. officials decided to let Lehman Brothers
collapse in September 2008, and just before the Federal Reserve unleashed a
torrent of programs to bolster the financial system, central-bank officials were
still struggling to grasp the magnitude of the calamity that had hit the
economy.").
194 See, e.g., GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 199 ("We had just suffered a
financial shock worse than the one that had led to the Great Depression.
Market volatility was more than a third higher than it had been after the crash
of 1929; bond spreads would rise more than twice as high; the percentage of
household wealth lost would be more than five times worse than in 1929.").
Lary Summers, former Treasury Secretary to President Clinton and director of
President Obama's National Economic Council, has observed that most
economic indicators were worse in the fall of 2008 than they were in the fall of
1929 and the winter of 1930-but the aftermath has been significantly less
awful than during the Depression. Larry Summers, Remarks at TMF Fourteenth
Annual Research Conference in Honor of Stanley Fischer (Nov. 8, 2013),
available at http://larrysummers.com/imf-fourteenth-annual-research-
conference-in-honor-of-stanley-fischer/, archived at http://perma.cc/86YL-
2SXE ("We have all agreed, and I think our agreement is warranted, that a
remarkable job was done in containing the 2007-2008 crisis. That an event that
in the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009 that appeared, by most of the statistics-
GDP, industrial production, employment, world trade, the stock market-
worse than the fall of 1929 and the winter of 1930, ended up in a way that
bears very little resemblance to the Great Depression."). He attributes this
largely to the regulatory response to the financial crisis in the last months of
2008. Summers, supra.
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at the Treasury Department during the sovereign debt crises of the
1990s.195 He later observed:
Just about every debate we had during the Asian
[sovereign debt] crisis would recur in the global crises
a decade later: tough love versus unconditional love,
Old Testament justice for arsonists versus pragmatic
concern for innocents, transparency versus
reassurance, austerity versus stimulus, liquidity versus
solvency. In every country, we debated how long to let
the fire bum before we should intervene aggressively,
what the likelihood was that it would spread, and
whether the people we wanted to save could be trusted
to do what they promised. 1
96
Geithner played a key role in stemming the crisis, and his experience
with the crises of the 1990s was formative.197 It is likely that the cnisis
response would not have been as effective as it was if one of the key
decision makers had not had actual experience dealing with sovereign
debt crises, which involve international investors running on a
country's banking system and/or refusing to roll over the government's
debt.198 It would be a mistake, however to take the presence of an
experienced decision maker in a crisis for granted. It was arguably a
stroke of luck that the position of president of the New York Fed
happened to be filled by someone with Geithner's crisis-fighting
experience. Furthermore, it seems likely that the crisis response was
hampered by the dearth of crisis-fighting experience among other key
decision makers.199 Geithner recently remarked in an interview with
195 See GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 37-74.
196 Id. at 69-70.
197 Geithner reports a joke about the danger of confusing corelation for
causation made by the governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, who
observed, "Tim was present at all the crises... But he didn't cause the crises.
The crises caused him." GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 74.
'9' See Hao Li, What Is a Sovereign Debt Crisis? Why Is It So Scary?, INT'L
Bus. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011, 11:19 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/what-
sovereign-debt-crisis-why-it-so-scaiy-372228, archived at http://pena.cc/
9JQ5-AU33.
'99 For example, Geithner convincingly argues that the FDIC's handling of
Washington Mutual's failure, shortly after Lehman, was severely bungled,
damaging confidence almost as much as the Lehman failure. Specifically, he
argues that the FDIC should have invoked the "systemic risk exception" to
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The Financial Times that during the crisis the Fed and Treasury had
"really remarkably collaborative and exceptionally talented people. But
I can tell you that the... practical knowledge base in those institutions
of what you do in a systemic panic was very limited .... 2 00
In a way, then, Geithner's story strengthens the case for
creating ersatz experience for regulators. At the same time, his career
path suggests that another possible way for regulators to attain relevant
crisis-fighting experience may be through exposing them to financial
crises in other countries, either as, for example, a staffer with the
international finance team at the Treasury Department, or through
secondment to foreign regulatory agencies.
201
In addition to Geithner, Secretary Paulson was on the
management eam at Goldman Sachs during its near-death experience
in 1994 and during the rescue of faltering hedge fund Long Term
Capital Management in 1998202 -hardly preparation for the events of
2008, but far more relevant than the experience of the previous two
Secretaries, both of whom had been chief executives at industrial
firms. 2 °3 And Fed chairman Bernanke, though lacking direct crisis-
fighting experience, complemented Paulson's market knowledge and
Geithner's crisis-fighting experience with a deep understanding of
depression economics.
204
avoid creditor haircuts, since failing to do so in the midst of a panic would
exacerbate the run on the system and worsen FDIC losses in the long run.
GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 214-16.
200 Transcript: Martin WolfInterviews Tim Geithner, FIN. TIMES (June 2, 2014,
12:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3d655d68-e978-1 le3-99ed-
00144feabdco.html#axzz3HkpKKw94, archived at http://pena.cc/ZU2F-
SU36.
201 See, e.g., GERDING, supra note 30, at 499 ("Regulators from these [e.g.,
securities and consumer finance] agencies should be regularly seconded to the
fledgling international organizations for regulatory cooperation, such as
IOSCO for securities regulators. Moreover, agencies should second staff to
counterparts in other countries in regular rotations. For example, regulators
from Britain's Financial Services Authority could be assigned to a tour of duty
with its counterpart in Japan.").
202 PAULSON, supra note 69, at 33-34.
203 Paulson's predecessors were Paul O'Neill, former chief executive of Alcoa,
and John Snow, former chief executive of CSX.
20' Bernanke was one of the leading scholars of the Great Depression prior to
joining the Fed. See Meet Ben Bernanke: Depression Scholar, Superhero,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/meet-ben-
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G. The Difficulty of Getting Experience
Assuming financial crises provide a valid environment and that
experience can help regulators build expertise in responding to crises,
the question arises as to how easy it is for regulators to get the relevant
experience to improve their crisis-fighting skills. Here we face a
problem articulated by Andrew Haldane in a widely-cited speech he
delivered at the Fed's annual conference in Jackson Hole in 2012.2o5
Haldane argued that the complexity of the financial regulatory
"playbook" was counterproductive and that a better approach would
206combine a simplified rulebook with more experienced regulators.
Yet, Haldane observed:
Therein lies a dilemma. Galbraith observed that:
"There can be few fields of human endeavour in which
history counts for so little as in the world of finance."
A full crisis cycle might last 20-30 years. A systemic
crisis might only occur once or twice a century.
Among risk managers, typical levels of experience are
significantly less than a full crisis cycle. The same is
207true among bank supervisors.
Financial crises are of the utmost public concern even if they occur
relatively infrequently-but it is a challenge, given their infrequency,
for regulators to develop experience in crisis-fighting and to put it to
use in the next crisis. It would seem, then, that the two requirements
other than validity for the development of reliable intuitive judgment by
experts are lacking: the chance to practice and receive feedback.
The next section takes up the possibility-the promise and the
challenges-of attempting to manufacture some relevant expertise, to
provide regulators with the opportunity to practice crisis-fighting, and
to provide them with feedback on the plausible consequences of their
decisions and actions. We will draw from another field where
experience is important to performance, and where such experience is
bernanke-depression-scholar-superhero-91865, archived at http://perma.cc/
SP5L-M99V.
205 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The dog and
the frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/review/
r120905a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FG6K-VHC2.
206 Id. at 16-17.
207 Id. (citation omitted).
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(thankfully) hard to come by for long periods of time: wargames in the
military.
IV. Manufacturing Experience with Wargames
Experience can contribute to regulatory expertise in crisis
management, yet is hard to attain due to the relative infrequency of
crises.208 Can we nonetheless try to manufacture experience so that
regulators are better equipped to respond to crises and to limit damage
to the real economy when crises occur? This Section considers the
possibility of building regulators' crisis-fighting skills by exposing
them to simulations, or wargames, of financial crises. I begin this
Section with a description of what I mean by wargames, followed by a
brief account of how wargames are already used to simulate financial
crises. Then I outline the potential advantages of wargames-how they
can work to improve regulatory skill-as well as some of the risks,
challenges, and potential limitations with respect to their use.
A. Wargames: Definition and Design
As a brief prefatory note, I use "crisis simulation"
interchangeably with "wargame." The term "wargame," however,
evokes a broader range of purposes, particularly with respect to the
military's tradition of using it as a tool to develop leaders and to
improve strategic (not just tactical) thinking among its decision makers.
What is a wargame? Peter Perla, a leading authority on the
subject, defines it as "a warfare model or simulation in which the flow
of events shapes, and is shaped by, decisions made by a human player
,,209or players during the course of those events. Wargames come in
many types, from board games210 to full-fledged field exercises.2 11 The
208 See id.
209 Peter Perla, So a Wargamer and a Black Swan Walk Into a Bar
PHALANX, Dec. 2008, at 1, 2.
210 The modem tradition of wargaming is usually traced to a complicated board
game called "Kriegsspiel" popular in the Prussian Army in the early 19th
centuly. See CHRISTOPHER GEORGE LEWIN, WAR GAMES AND THEIR HISTORY
40-44 (2012). When the game was demonstrated to the chief of the Prussian
General Staff, Friedrich von Miiffling, he is reputed to have said, "'This is not
a game! This is training for war! I must recommend it to the whole army."' Id.
at 43.
211 See Brendan Koerner, How Do the Pentagon's "War Games" Work?,
SLATE (Sept. 17, 2002, 5:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
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term also applies, and is used here to refer, to "conference room" role-
playing simulations.212
Philip Sabin, professor of strategic studies at King's College
London, identifies two fundamental components of wargames, the first
being, "an underlying... model of reality... [intended to] provid[e] a
synthetic experimental environment that mirrors in certain key respects
the real range of potential courses and outcomes associated with the
[crisis] concerned.,213 The second, "equally fundamental" element of
wargames is
an iterative set of active decision inputs by one or
more players ... [who must] respond to the changing
course of the simulated conflict, in order to maximize
their relative or absolute performance in terms of
artificial victory criteria established to reflect the real
measures of success and failure associated with the
actual [event].
214
The way this typically plays out is that the wargame "designers" create
a scenario based on a particular model of reality, as well as on months
of exhaustive research, and present it to different "teams" that need to
react to the situation in some way. A financial crisis simulation designer
for the World Bank describes it as follows:
news andpolitics/explainer/2002/09/how do thepentagons war games wo
rk.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZQD5-ZJXH.
212 It is worth distinguishing between this type of simulation and other
counterfactual tools regulators use, particularly the Dodd-Frank-prescribed
"stress tests" and "living wills." See generally Baradaran, supra note 24. Stress
tests try to model what would happen to bank capital levels under various
adverse economic conditions. Id. at 159. They do not model contagion effects
or liquidity squeezes, nor do they involve regulators assuming simulated roles
or trying to respond to crises under conditions of uncertainty. Id. at 1299.
Living wills try to provide a blueprint for regulators to follow to wind down an
institution in the event of failure. Id. at 1300-01. They are institution-specific
and do not model systemic effects, nor (again) do they involve anything like
role-playing simulations. Id. at 1307. Despite the different (if overlapping)
functions these regulatory tools serve, it is certainly possible that the lessons
from, e.g., stress tests could inforn the design of wargames, and that
wargaming could, in turn, inforn stress test design modifications.
213 PHILIP SABIN, SIMULATING WAR: STUDYING CONFLICT THROUGH




Participants (frequently the Minister of Finance, the
Central Bank Governor, the Head of Bank
Supervision, and other top national decision makers)
receive a stream of (generally bad) news throughout
the duration of the exercise, which describes the
"scenario" (sequence of challenges) they must
[manage] with the instruments provided by the (real or
assumed) legal, regulatory, and operational
frameworks.215
An event that fell short of a fully formed wargame, but which gives a
good sense of the flavor of activity contemplated here, is a banking
crisis simulation sponsored by The Economist at its "Buttonwood
Gathering" in New York City in 2011.216 The simulation assigned key
roles to prominent current and former regulators (most of whom had
either actually served in the role they were playing, or had served in a
position just below it).217 The regulators were presented with a scenario
of a Lehman-like bank failure, and had to hash out a plan of action for
dealing with it under the new Orderly Liquidation Authority created by
Dodd Frank.218 As the players talked in front of a live audience over the
course of an hour, they were able to work through many of the
215 Aquiles Almansi, When Financial Crises Attacks, WORLD BANK PRIVATE
SECTOR DEv. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/when-financial-
crises-attacks, archived at http://perma.cc/DCS4-NAK3.
216 R.A., The Economist Stress Tests Dodd-Frank, ECONOMIST FREE EXCH.
(Nov. 2, 2011, 1:03 PM) , http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/
2011/1 /banking-regulation, archived at http://perma.cc/TKV5-KS32.
2 Lary Summers assumed his old role as Treasury Secretary; Donald Kohn,
former vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
played the role of Fed chairman; Peter Fisher, former executive vice president
of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, assumed the role of its president;
Jerome (Jay) Powell, a former assistant secretary and undersecretary of the
Treasury, played the role of Treasury Undersecretary for Domestic Finance;
John Dugan, the former Comptroller of the Currency, played the chairman of
the FDIC; Diana Farrell, former Deputy Director of the White House National
Economic Council, played the role of its Director; and H. Rodgin ("Rodge")
Cohen, former chairman of the law fin Sullivan & Cromwell and the leading
banking lawyer in the United States, played the role of Treasury General
Counsel. Id. (laying out the roles beginning at about the 5:00 minute mark in
the first video on the site).
218 Id.
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intricacies of the new law and ponder the potentially dangerous
219consequences of each possible course of action they might choose.
One of the advantages of the simulation (as I will highlight again
below) was that it forced its participants and designers to come to terms
with the constraints imposed by the law. During the question and
answer session following the exercise, Jay Powell, who since the
simulation has joined the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, noted
that he was surprised at "how poorly understood [Dodd Frank] is, even
among people who you would think would know it cold.
,220
The Buttonwood Gathering simulation roughly corresponded
to what wargame designers would term the "first move," comprising
the teams' initial decisions or reactions to the game's opening
scenano.221 A key question for wargame designers is what happens
after the first move. Players' decisions or actions must be processed in
some way (and new information may be added) to inform decision-
222making for a second, and then, possibly, a third and a fourth, move.
Here the key question is "whether it [is] better to codify the game
system within comprehensive rles... or to base the modelling of' the
impact of the team's decisions "on the wisdom and experience of an
umpire.' 23 Typically, there is a hybrid approach,224 with a "mission
control" team to gather feedback, process moves, and keep the game
running smoothly.2
It is worth highlighting three different (non-exhaustive and
non-mutually exclusive) ways of generating consequences or outcomes
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See MARK HERMAN ET AL., WARGAMING FOR LEADERS: STRATEGIC
DECISION MAKING FROM THE BATTLEFIELD TO THE BOARDROOM 17 (2009).
222 Wargames may last for less than a day or may extend to more than a week.
Professional wargamers at the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. say
most games they design last for two days and comprise three moves:
Through trial and error, we have learned that a thie-move exercise
provides the flexibility to develop and complete the game without
placing an unreasonable burden on the players' time. Three moves,
furthermore, give the players enough experience with the possible
scenarios to get to the endgame and envision a resolution.
Id.
223 SABIN, supra note 213, at 31.
224 Id. at 31-32.
225 Pai Wright, Domestic Crisis Simulation Exercises: The UK, EUR. CENT.
BANK (July 12, 2007), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/
conferences/sfilWright.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6TAW-7WYD.
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from players' or teams' key decisions during the first move. First,
mission control could simply posit consequences of team actions.
Ideally, this would be based on a combination of historical research on
previous crises and a thorough understanding of current institutional
frameworks. This approach is consistent with the view that wargames
are not meant to be strictly predictive, but rather to present decision
makers with plausible scenarios to help them practice working through
the types of decisions they will have to make under extremely tight
time constraints, and anticipate types of potential unintended
consequences that may follow from a given decision or action.
227
A second approach would be to assign players to serve as
representatives of different institutions or even of categories of market
participant, such as repo lenders. While financial crisis simulations
typically do not involve the same degree of competition that military
wargames do, one could try to inject competition into one by, for
example, creating "bank accounts" for players representing short-term
creditors of financial institutions and (a) imposing a cost for withdrawal
while also (b) penalizing them for failing to withdraw prior to borrower
failure. The goal-difficult but attainable, I believe-would be to
simulate real run-like dynamics.
Third, one might employ agent-based models ("ABMs") as a
way to try to map the chaotic, nonlinear dynamics that one sees in
markets in a real crisis.228 An ABM is a computerized model that
specif~ies] rules that dictate how agents will act based
on various inputs. Each agent individually assesses its
situation and makes decisions on the basis of the rules.
Once the model has specified the initial conditions and
the agents' rules, the "world" is let loose and all
subsequent events are driven by agent interactions.
229
226 See id.
227 See supra Part III.C.
22' For an excellent account of ABMs, see generally Richard Bookstaber,
Using Agent-Based Models for Analyzing Threats to Financial Stability (Office
of Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 0003, 2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/Documents/OFR Working Pa
per No3_ABM Bookstaber Final.pdf, archived at http://penna.cc/M59H-
LBAD.
229 Id. at 4. Bookstaber explains that agents in such models "might represent
biological organisms, social groupings, institutions, or physical entities." Id. In
the context of financial crises, "the key agents for analyzing systemic risk are
those that provide funding, those on the other side who are leverage, and those
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ABMs depend on model assumptions about (often heterogeneous)
individual behavior, but these assumptions tend to be relatively
straightforward and uncontroversial; as with the butterfly effect,2 3° the
complexity arises from the interaction of agents, not from the structure
of the agents' individual decision-making rules. The ABM allows us to
see-given baseline assumptions about individual behavior and rules
for interactions-what happens or might happen as the interactions play
out.
231
A further central element in the design and implementation of
wargames is, of course, the scope of participation.232 The focus of this
Article is on decision-making personnel at key financial regulatory
agencies.233 This would include, for example, not just the Treasury
Secretary or the chairperson of the Federal Reserve, but the personnel
one and two levels down who would participate in brainstorming and
designing policy interventions in an actual crisis. It may also be worth
considering involving industry participants, either during the design
stage or in the game itself, or both. The upside to this would be adding
potentially greater verisimilitude in terms of current market practices
and institutions, as well as plausible market reactions to various policy
moves. The downside would be that industry participants may be more
likely to try to manipulate the wargaming process to influence
regulation or supervision in their favor.234
who are liquidity providers." Id. at 16. The sorts of rules that could be
prescribed include
how leverage is to be reduced as a hedge fund approaches its margin
limit or risk limit; how a bank plans to react in terms of increasing its
haircuts to its clients, reducing its inventory and thus market-making
posture, and liquidating assets; or how the participants in a short-term
funding market are expected to react to an increase in counterparty or
collateral risk.
Id. at 17.
231 See Ruhl, supra note 34, at 887.
231 See Bookstaber, supra note 228, at 2.
232 See HERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 4.
233 The key institutions would be the Treasury Department, the Federal
Reserve, and the FDIC. Other important agencies include the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
234 See, e.g., infra notes 290-96 and accompanying text.
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B. Current Uses and Purposes
Crisis simulations are not new to financial regulators and
market participants. In the half-decade leading up to the financial crisis,
the FDIC ran a series of increasingly complex bank resolution
simulations.235 Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, the FDIC has run
simulations to test its new Orderly Liquidation Authority to wind down
non-bank financial institutions.236 Federal Reserve officials have
participated in these FDIC-sponsored simulations, and Treasury
officials have observed them.237 Financial industry trade associations
have run large-scale simulations of financial firm resolution under the
OLA 238 and of a cyber-attack on the financial system.239 The World
Bank has run at least twenty crisis simulations for different countries
around the world since 2009.240 Additionally, the European Central
Bank actually ran a conference on modeling and simulating financial
crises in 2007, just before the actual crisis fully descended upon its
participants.
241
215 See Michael Krimminger, Contingency Planning & Simulation Exercises:
Practical Applications, EuR. CENT. BANK 7 (July 12, 2007),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/sfi/Krinminger.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/EN69-GJ9D. It is perhaps worth noting that of all
the things that went wrong in the crisis, commercial bank resolutions were
carried out smoothly and efficiently.
236 Telephone Interview with Michael Krimininger, Partner, Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP (June 3, 2013).
237 Id.
231 See THE CLEARING HOUSE, REPORT ON THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY RESOLUTION SYMPOSIUM AND SIMULATION (2013), available at
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/Files/Association%/ 20Documents/2
01301170o2OTCH%/o20Resolution o20 Simulation o20 Symposium o20Report.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3FN9-TRHR.
239 Press release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, SIFIA Announces Key
Findings of Quantum Dawn 2 (Oct. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2013/sifma-announces-key-findings-of-
quantum-dawn-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZNL-ABVT. The UK
government (as opposed to a private trade group) has also run a crisis
simulation of a cyberattack. Matt Scuffham & Steve Slater, Cyber Attack 'War
Game' to Test London Banks, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/12/us-banks-wargame-
idUSBRE9ABOO620131112, archived at http://perma.cc/NJ6R-J3E6.
240 Almansi, supra note 215.
241 See generally EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, SIMULATING FINANCIAL
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These simulations have a number of non-controversial benefits.
They can be an extremely efficient and effective way to familiarize
players with constraints-legal, political, and policy-and to give
regulators a better understanding of the constraints other regulators
face.242 They can promote cooperation across agencies, and socialize
key actors to new laws, regulations, or institutional arrangements.
243
They can test institutional coordination, lines of communication, and
decision-making processes in a way that goes beyond mere simulation
to actual real-world stress-testing.244 These benefits alone may justify
periodic crisis simulations. In the next section, however, I consider
whether they can serve afurther purpose-to help inform and improve
245the substance of possible responses.
C. The Power of Wargames
There are two chief functions of wargames: training and
research.246 While my focus is primarily on training-that is, preparing
regulators to anticipate and respond to cisis-like dynamics-research is
germane to the extent it may serve to improve the models used by
regulators.
Wargames serve both purposes by providing participants with
a sort of ersatz experience. First, the game may make new, or newly
salient, facts available to its participants, which might help them hone,
INSTABILITY (2008), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/simulatingfinancialinstability2008O9en.pdf, archived at
http://pena.cc/5243-CFY6.
242 This can be a particularly important function of wargames given the degree
to which the crisis response in 2008 and 2009 depended largely on creative use
of the authorities that existed. Perhaps the most notable example of this was the
use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee money market funds. See
PAULSON, supra note 69, at 252. Since Dodd-Frank involved abolishing old
authorities (such as the FDIC's broad guarantee powers) just as it created new
ones (such as the Orderly Liquidation Authority), this type of creative
lawyering will likely play an important role in the next crisis.
243 See HERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 94.
244 See id.
245 As those familiar with our litigation system might observe, substantive
outcomes are often driven by process and procedural rules, but these are just
one among many factors that might determine the substance of a particular
system.
246 See HERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 7.
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amend, or replace their mental models.247 Gary Gorton, in his book
Misunderstanding Financial Crises, contrasts social science on this
front to the physical sciences, in which experimental evidence can
decisively (if not instantaneously) shift the theoretical paradigm.248 He
cites as an example the famous 1887 experiment by Albert Michelson
and Edward Morley that proved the death knell of the ether theory,249 as
well as Galileo's use of the telescope to corroborate Copernicus's
theories.250 He tells us,
Seeing in the social sciences is complicated-there are
no Michelson-Morley experiments. That is, there is
never a single experimental result that once and for all
demonstrates that a theory is dead, or alters how the
world is seen. There is no telescope of Galileo to
confirm the ideas of Copernicus. In the social sciences
there is never an empirical result that causes the world
suddenly to be seen differently. That only happens
over a long period of time. But there are events that
may sometimes serve the same purpose. The financial
crisis is such an event.
251
Revising our models for the better depends on our being disabused of
mistaken notions; as experiments serve this purpose in the natural
sciences, so may experience do so in the social sciences.
Wargames may approximate the effect of experience in
disproving incorrect notions and helping us redraw our mental maps.252
While a wargame must be driven by model assumptions, the iterative
feedback provided by human participants can conceivably generate
outcomes that regulators and game designers had not fully considered
before.253 This can suggest new variations on, amendments to, or
enrichments of the model or models regulators use in a crisis. It is also
probably the best (and possibly the only) way to try to address a
dilemma captured by Thomas Schelling, the Nobel Prize-winning game
theorist: "One thing a person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his
247 See id.
248 Gorton, supra note 38, at 201.
249 Id. at 201 & 246 n.1.
250 Id. at 201.
251 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
252 See HERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 7.
253 See id. at 3-4.
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analysis or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a list of things that
would never occur to him. ,
254
Changing regulators' mental maps-to build on the "connect
the dots" metaphor described above-affects which dots they
"recognize [as] worth connecting," and "remind[s them] which dots
[they] need to complete the picture . 255 In doing so, it also (for better or
worse) can change their priorities.256
One example of the impact of actual experience on the
formulation of policy arose from the Obama administration's reaction
to the near success of the "underwear bomber" in his attempt to
detonate a bomb on an airplane from Amsterdam to Detroit on
Christmas Day, 2009.257 According to Ryan Lizza, writing in The New
Yorker, this event had a big impact on Obama's team, and on their
attitudes regarding the appropriate balance between security and
privacy:
"The White House people felt it in their gut with a
visceralness that they did not before," Michael Leiter,
who was then the director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, said .... "It's not that they
thought terrorism was over and it was done with,"
Leiter said, "but until you experience your first
concrete attack on the homeland, not to mention one
that becomes a huge political firestorm-that changes
your outlook really quickly." He added, "It
encouraged them to be more aggressive with
strikes"-drone attacks in Yemen and Pakistan-"and
even stronger supporters of maintaining things like the
Patriot Act.,
258
In a similar vein but in the context of financial crises, Gorton has
claimed that "[t]o really understand a financial crisis one needs to be an
eyewitness, to see it.",
259
The key question, however, is whether anything like the impact
of a financial crisis can be achieved outside of actual real-world
251 Id. at 3. This dilemma is know as Schelling's "impossibility theorem." Id.
255 KLEIN, supra note 52, at 185.
256 See id.
257 Ryan Lizza, State of Deception, NEW YORKER, Dec. 16, 2003, at 58.
258 
Id.
259 GORTON, supra note 38, at 200.
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experience. Peter Perla and E.D. McGrady argue that it can; that, for
example, well-told narratives or stories can create salience far beyond
what data and analysis or academic writing can achieve.260 To illustrate,
they recount the profound effect the novel The Cobra Event26' had on
then-President Bill Clinton's thinking about biological terrorism.262 All
the (copious) official analyses and assessments of the threat of
biological terrorism did not affect Clinton as much as The Cobra Event:
"The book found a curious resonance within Clinton, which led to a
profound interest and concern about the threat."263 Clinton asked for an
intelligence assessment of the book's plausibility, and this, combined
with a White House wargame on biological terrorism carried out
around the same time, led Clinton to push for a $294 million increase to
the counterterrorism budget.264 Perla and McGrady conclude that "[t]he
dramatization of the narrative in The Cobra Event (and the
reinforcement of that experience in the game) seemed to access parts of
President Clinton's imagination and attention that other sources of
information could not.,265 They theorize that the "suspension of
disbelief' that readers or viewers experience when drawn into a
narrative on page or screen makes the narrative's message more "real"
than a similar or substantively identical message conveyed by factual
argument.266 Reading a great novel or seeing a great movie about an
event is a far cry from experiencing it, but it does make the event's
261 Peter P. Perla & E.D. McGrady, Why Wargaming Works, NAVAL WAR C.
REV., Summer 2011, at 111, 112 ("We propose the idea that gaming's
transformative power grows out of its particular connections to storytelling; we
find in a combination of elements from traditional narrative theory and
contemporary neuroscience the germ of our thesis-that gaming, as a story-
living experience, engages the human brain, and hence the human being
participating in a game, in ways more akin to real-life experience than to
reading a novel or watching a video. By creating for its participants a synthetic
experience, gaming gives them palpable and powerful insights that help them
prepare better for dealing with complex and uncertain situations in the
future.").
261 See generally RICHARD PRESTON, THE COBRA EVENT (1997).
262 Perla & McGrady, supra note 260, at 114.
261 Id. (citing TOM MANGOLD & JEFF GOLDBERG, PLAGUE WARS: THE
TERRIFYING REALITY OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 363 (1999)).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 115.
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lessons live in the mind in a way that a typical academic paper or
journalistic report does not.267
Perla and McGrady argue that a "high-engagement" wargame
can have an even more powerful effect on its participants than a well-
done book or movie, because its participants are not mere passive
recipients of the narrative, but help create it.268 They argue that "[t]he
combination of venue, kinesthetic actions, social interactions, and
dramaturgical effects-all moderated and responded to via active or
passive control-allows the players to come closer to entering literally
into the world of the game than they ever could in a watched or read
" ,,269
narrative.
The salience of a "merged" narrative (one combining
designers' and players' contributions) helps firmly place the various
scenarios players encounter into the repertoire of patterns on which
they can draw when problem-solving in a real crisis.270 What matters, to
reiterate, is not that the particular scenarios are predictive of actual
267 See id. It is, perhaps, instructive that in trying to convey not just the
sequence of events during the crisis, but what it was like to try to respond to it,
Geithner cites a movie, writing:
I didn't have a way to explain the terror of those days until later,
when I saw The Hurt Locker, the Oscar-winning film about a bomb
disposal unit in Iraq. What we went through on interminable
conference calls in fancy office buildings obviously did not compare
to the horrors of war, but ten minutes into the movie I knew I had
finally found something that captured what the crisis felt like: the
overwhelming burden of responsibility combined with the paralyzing
risk of catastrophic failure; the frustration about the stuff out of your
control; the uncertainty about what would help; the knowledge that
even good decisions might turn out badly; the pain and guilt of
neglecting your family; the loneliness and the numbness.
GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 200.
Later, Geithner draws parallels between financial crisis management
and physicians' attempts to diagnose, treat, and triage, as represented in Atul
Gawande's memoir Complications: Notes from the Life of a Young Surgeon
and the TV series House M.D.: "That's financial crisis management more or
less. It's diagnosis and treatment, prevention and cure, triage and surgery. The
stakes are high and the outcomes are uncertain. Evey case is different but
some protocols can be applied broadly." Id. at 509-10.
268 Perla & McGrady, supra note 260, at 218.
269 Id. at 120-21. Perla and McGrady define dramaturgical effects as "signals
that people send in social situations to establish both their identities and the
overall social relationship." Id. at 120.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
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crises, but that they are plausible, and provide a valid, if stylized, sense
of the cause-and-effect dynamics in play during a crisis.27' Wargames,
then, may help build a repertoire of experience that enriches regulators'
mental models, increases their perceptual skills in reading jittery
markets, and facilitates a greater degree of quick, efficient pattern
matching and anomaly spotting.272
Because wargames make crisis dynamics more salient, they
may also, in fact, help prevent crises, in addition to preparing regulators
to respond to them. They may, that is, serve as an antidote to the
complacency that inevitably settles in during long "quiet periods,,
273
thereby increasing regulatory vigilance and encouraging proactive steps
to address problems at a troubled institution or in a troubled market
before they grow too large.274 In describing the early years of his tenure
at the New York Fed, before the crisis hit, Geithner states,
I had vivid memories of the crises of the previous
decade, [and] I wanted to examine the darkest
plausible scenarios, the seemingly implausible "tail
risks." In meeting after meeting, I argued that
regulators and risk managers alike needed to set aside
assumptions about the implausibility of a major shock
and study the impact of that shock if it somehow
happened. This provoked a fair amount of skepticism
internally, and derision outside the Fed.275
The skepticism Geithner describes may ultimately be insurmountable,
but well-designed wargames at least seem more likely than other
methods to overcome it. Furthermore, a well-designed wargame may
be the best way of accomplishing precisely what Geithner urged-
namely, suppressing optimistic assumptions, even if players do not
completely abandon such assumptions, in order to think seriously about
how they should respond if a shock did have an unexpectedly large
negative impact.
Robert Rubel, dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies,
provides a good summation of the benefits of wargames, reaching
271 See supra text accompanying note 227.
272 Cf KLEIN, supra note 52, at 35 (discussing how tacit knowledge is vital
when coping with complex situations).
273 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
271 See Perla & McGrady, supra note 260, at 122.
275 GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 93.
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conclusions in the military context that can apply in important ways to
financial markets, as well: "Games allow players and observers to see
relationships-geographic, temporal, functional, political, and other-
that would otherwise not be possible to discern. Seeing and
understanding these relationships prepares the mind for decisions in a
complex environment.,276  Of course, we cannot expect our
understanding of these relationships, in either war or a financial crisis,
to provide the sort of certainty that an engineer enjoys within the scope
of her metier. Games can, however, produce "indicative" knowledge, or
knowledge that "can indicate the possibilities of a projected warfare
situation and certain cause-and-effect linkages," which can be very
useful in evaluating complex problems.277
D. Challenges and Obstacles
While the potential benefits of wargames are impressive, a
number of cautionary notes should be sounded. As Perla and McGrady
state: "When it works, wargaming can appear almost magical in its
power to inform and instruct; when it doesn't work, it can appear
almost childish in its oversimplifications and abstractions.278
First and foremost, for a wargame to serve its purpose, the
underlying model of reality on which the game is based must bear a
sufficiently close relationship to the way things really are.279 This does
not mean that the game must mimic reality in great detail-wargames
useful for both research and training purposes can distill key elements
of reality and focus on isolated cause-effect relationships.
280
Nonetheless, in any such exercise, there is a risk that the model may
simply fail to capture the relevant aspects of reality, in which case the
wargame may be not just useless but counterproductive.28'
276 Rubel, supra note 191, at 112.
277 Id.
278 Perla & McGrady, supra note 260, at 111-12.
279 Id. at 123.
280 Indeed, tractability demands such distillation-thus the insight famously
captured by Jorge Luis Borges, that a map that corresponded point for point
with what it represented would be useless. JORGE LUIS BORGES, On Exactitude
in Science, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 325, 325 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998).
281 Perla & McGrady, supra note 260, at 123. A variation on this objection is
the concern that financial wargames may train regulators to "fight the last
war." This objection has force if we expect wargames to help us prevent the
shocks and vulnerabilities that may give rise to crisis dynamics. A central
argument of this Article, however, is that once crisis dynamics kick in, they
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At first glance, this is no small quibble, given the variance in
opinion on what led to the crisis in the first place. MIT economist
Andrew Lo in his Twenty-One-Book Review of books on the crisis
compares the various accounts to the movie Rashomon, in which a
brutal crime is "described in contradictory ways by four individuals
who participated in various aspects of the crime.',28 2 Lo tells us that
"[a]t the end of the film, we're left with several mutually inconsistent
narratives, none of which completely satisfies our need for redemption
and closure."283 Drawing a parallel to the crisis, he argues that the
movie's
message of multiple truths couldn't be more relevant
as we sift through the wreckage of the worst financial
crisis since the Great Depression. Even the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission-a prestigious bipartisan
committee of ten experts with subpoena power who
deliberated for eighteen months, interviewed over 700
witnesses, and held nineteen days of public hearings-
presented three different conclusions in its final report.
Apparently, it's complicated.284
While opinions vary immensely, however, with respect to what caused
the housing bubble in the first place, and with respect to how and why
key financial institutions were so vulnerable to a shock,285 the gaps are
significantly smaller with respect to how the crisis manifested itself and
display certain persistent structural similarities, even if the institutional
manifestations of these dynamics differ greatly across crises. It is nonetheless
essential for an effective crisis response that regulators stay up to date on the
financial system's architecture and new market products, practices, and trends.
Well-designed wargames could actually support this objective.
282 Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book
Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 151, 151 (2012) (book review).
283 Id.
284 Id. at 151-52.
285 Candidates include, inter alia, lax regulation, an international "savings
glut," securitization, government housing policy, skewed incentives at Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, skewed incentives on Wall Street, derivatives, and the
Gmmm-Leach-Bliley Act (which removed the restriction on affiliations
between broker-dealers and commercial banks). See generally FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf, archived at
http ://perma.cc/UCD9-LQP6.
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what the appropriate steps to take were once the crisis was underway.286
Yet again, the distinction between predicting specific shocks, on the
one hand, and predicting how initial losses can work their way through
the financial system and affect the real economy, on the other, proves
crucial.287 Indeed, Justin Fox recounts how, despite the deep fissures in
opinions among economists with respect to monetary and
macroeconomic policy choices since 2009, "[i]t's remarkable how
widespread among academic economists . . . was the view that on the
whole" the crisis-fighting measures taken in the final months of 2008
were "the right thing to do."288
In any event, regulators must operate based on some
underlying models and theoretical assumptions, even if these models
and assumptions are entirely tacit. The important thing, even as one
operates within the constraints of a given model, is to be alive to new
evidence that might undermine that model. Properly designed
wargames might even help develop this flexible sort of attitude.
A second note of caution about wargames is that their
effectiveness might be stymied by bureaucratic imperatives. This
might, for example, be evidenced in the degree to which bad actions
and events are underplayed in a scenario-what Perla and McGrady
call "the sanitary fantasy. '289 It may also manifest itself in the reaction
of the bureaucracy to the lessons of the simulations.
One example involves a story recounted in Malcolm
Gladwell's book Blink of the Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame-
"the largest and most expensive war game thus far in history."290 The
"Blue Team" (representing the United States) had technological
capabilities orders of magnitude greater than those of the "Red Team"
(representing "a rogue military commander" and his army "somewhere
in the Persian Gulf') .291 A retired Marine Corps general named Paul
286 See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
288 Justin Fox, What We've Learned from the Financial Crisis, HARV. BUS.
REV., Nov. 2013, at 94, 97. The consensus that the guarantees, capital
injections, and other steps taken by regulators in late 2008 and early 2009 were
appropriate and likely saved us from much worse economic damage is
overwhelming but not unanimous. Contra Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel,
Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 471 (2010) ("[W]e believe that
allowing the bankruptcy process to work is preferable to an ad-hoc approach of
preventing bankruptcy with last-minute rescue efforts.").
289 Perla & McGrady, supra note 260, at 123.
291 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 102 (2005).
291 Id. at 102-05.
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Van Riper was assigned the role of the Red Team rogue commander,
and flummoxed both the Blue Team and the game designers by
adopting a number of low-tech tactics to operate below Blue Team's
radar.292 He launched a surprise attack that (in the game) sank sixteen
American war ships: "Had Millennium Challenge been a real war
instead of just an exercise, twenty thousand American servicemen and
women would have been killed before their own army had even fired a
shot.,
293
Those running the wargame (which was to last two-and-a-half
weeks) decided to refloat the sunken ships and to resurrect several of
pro-U.S. leaders that Van Riper had (in the game) assassinated.29 4 More
disturbingly, Van Riper reported:
"The day after the attack, I walked into the command
room and saw the gentleman who was my number two
giving my team a completely different set of
instructions .... It was things like-shut off the radar
so Blue force are not interfered with. Move ground
forces so marines can land without any interference. I
asked, 'Can I shoot down one V-twenty-two?' and he
said, 'No, you can't shoot down any V-twenty-two's.'
I said, 'What the hell's going on in here?' He said,
'Sir, I've been given guidance by the program director
to give completely different directions.' The second
round was all scripted, and if they didn't get what they
liked, they would just run it again.,
295
When the wargame "Was won by Blue Team in a rout," Gladwell
reports, "the analysts at JFCOM and the Pentagon were jubilant.,
296
While the bureaucratic bias in this story-which should
perhaps be taken with a grain of salt29 7 -is quite blatant, there are
subtler ways for bureaucratic players to distort games to serve personal
or agency agendas. The most obvious, but by no means only, example
2 92 Id. at 106-11.
293 Id. at 110.
294 Id. at 145.
295 
Id.
296 Id. at 146.
297 See, e.g., Julian Borger, Wake-up Call, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2002, 8:56
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/06/usa.iraq, archived at
http://perma.cc/JT32-N6BS.
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is to play up results that would lead to more resources and authority
being devoted to a given agency, and to ignore or bury results that
might lead to resources or authority being diverted away from an
agency.298 For this reason, one might, for example, be skeptical of the
FDIC's or industry groups' conclusions about the efficacy of the OLA
299based on a wargame.
If the decision makers at the very top of an organizational
hierarchy are committed to a particular bureaucratic agenda, there may
be no effective response to the problem.3 °° If, however, the concern is
with those trying to influence the top-level decision makers, a possible
response to this problem is to ensure that the wargames are not
designed and run by the affected bureaucrats. Who, then, should run the
wargames? The military sometimes uses outside consultants, who by
all accounts can do excellent work, but this does not solve the problem
of bureaucratic independence to the degree that the consultants hope to
win further business from key decision makers within the sponsoring
agency.301 Another possibility is to create an independent and
autonomous unit devoted to running wargames for financial regulatory
agencies, with appropriate immunity from bureaucratic pressures
related to funding and job security. The Office of Financial Research
might be one possible home for such an agency.30 2 Finally, academic
institutions might also provide effective forums for wargames.3 °3 One
recent candidate is the recently established "Systemic Risk Institute" at
298 Robert Rubel calls the uncomfortable messages of wargames "whispers,"
and warns against the temptation to ignore them. See Rubel, supra note 191, at
124.
299 See id. at 125 ("A sponsoring organization... cannot realistically be relied
upon' to incorporate uncomfortable messages from the war games into its
lessons learned, "especially if constrained by time, political imperatives, or the
dictates of theory and doctrine .. .
300 See id.
301 See id. at 125.
302 The Office of Financial Research was established by the Dodd-Frank Act.
See About the OFR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.
treasuiy.gov/initiatives/ofr/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 30,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BZ3J-G6N6 (reporting that the Office of
Financial Research is intended "to improve the quality of financial data
available to policymakers and to facilitate more robust and sophisticated
analysis of the financial system").
303 See Rubel, supra note 191, at 125.
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Yale University.3 °4 Over two weeks during the summer of 2014, top
personnel "from U.S. and international regulatory agencies... spent six
hours each day in a classroom analyzing the government's response to
various crises."305 The Institute organizers hope "[f]uture sessions could
... creat[e] a 'war room' scenario where regulators can discuss and
learn how to respond to crises."
306
A further significant qualification is that wargames are
costly-in the labor taken to design them and, above all, in making
demands on the time of key decision makers.30 7 Malcolm Knight,
former General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of
International Settlements, stated at a European Central Bank conference
on crisis simulation in 2007,
"War games" that are played in crisis simulation
exercises are at a preliminary stage. I have been
particularly impressed by the high resource costs of
these exercises, in terms of the amount of work that
goes into designing the scenarios that trigger the crises
and the key problems to be solved; the amount of time
and effort of senior policymakers required to play the
game; and the difficulties of taking account of the
strategic reactions of the various players, particularly
in the private sector, after the initial shock. Because
these costs are high, such crisis simulation exercises
are likely to be undertaken only infrequently.30 8
But Knight goes on to state that "[g]iven the rate of innovation in the
financial system, this raises the concern that policymakers may be out
of date when a crisis actually occurs"-and his proposed solution to
this is ensuring that regulators are up to date "on the structure and key
business activities of the major financial institutions in their
304 Ryan Tacy, No S'More Crises: Global Financial Regulators Gather for





307 See Malcolm Knight, Interventions at the Policy Panel, in SIMULATING
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY, supra note 241, at 35, 36.
308 Id.
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jurisdictions" (something one would hope regulators have a handle on
in any event).3 °9
The cost concern is significant, but if wargames were to
become routinized, it is possible that the design costs would fall as a
cadre of wargame "architects" developed expertise.310 A marginal cost-
benefit calculation for top regulators' time (even if it were possible) is
beyond the scope of this Article, but even Knight-speaking, it should
be noted, prior to the unfolding of the global financial crisis-seems to
admit some time commitment from top officials is worthwhile.311
Another potential drawback is that wargaming financial
catastrophes could have an adverse impact on market confidence in
stressful times. Paulson reports that his Treasury staff had, at one point,
considered running "tabletop exercises on the failure of a government-
sponsored enterprise like Fannie Mae and the collapse of the dollar, but
decided against doing so for fear that word might leak to the press,




This concern, again, is serious, but transparency and routinization could
likely dissipate much of its force. The particular fear is that the market
will view the subject of the exercise as a signal of what regulators (with
a more comprehensive and complete view than market participants)
fear might actually happen.313 If regulators look panicked, it could
precipitate the very run everyone had hoped to avoid. But if the market
comes to understand that the exercises are done on a routine basis with
scenarios picked far in advance, it seems less likely they will see
wargames as an indication of current heightened regulatory fears about
a particular scenario or institution.
Finally, player buy-in is important, but might be difficult to
attain if scenarios are too negative during a period of stability.314 This is
the flipside of the potential advantage wargames have in getting people
to think about dark scenarios that they do not expect to occur. Former
Federal Reserve governor Elizabeth Duke observed in a speech in 2010
that:
309 Id.
310 See Rubel, supra note 191, at 126-27.
311 See Knight, supra note 307, at 40.
312 PAULSON, supra note 69, at 52.
313 See id. at 52.
314 See GEITHNER, supra note 70, at 93 ("A financial CEO who was unusually
cautious about leverage during the boom probably would have been fired




[T]he credibility of a simulation exercise comes from
its similarity to real world conditions that students
have experienced. [Prior to the crisis], .. . if I had tried
to simulate an environment in which interest rates
dropped from more than 5 percent to near zero in 16
months, unemployment went to 10 percent, housing
prices dropped nearly 30 percent, mortgage
delinquencies hovered around 10 percent, and credit
card loss rates went over 10 percent, nobody would
have believed it.
315
The inability to believe something is possible may be unsolvable with
respect to individual decision makers, but if anything short of its actual
occurrence can address this, it must be the sort of merged, lived
narrative that a wargame entails. As noted above, wargames may be the
best antidote to the complacency that inevitably arises from a long
period without extreme turmoil.
316
V. Conclusion
Rare catastrophic events that are malleable to human
intervention pose a special challenge: we want to be sure that our
interventions shape events to our advantage, but the infrequency of the
event means that respondents are typically learning on the job with each
new crisis.3 17 Preventing such catastrophes must be a priority, but
exclusive reliance on ex ante measures would be misguided, leaving us
worse off when the next crisis (inevitably) hits.318 The potentially
stratospheric costs of a financial crisis demand that we devote some
thought and energy to ensuring effective interventions when panic
strikes again. Wargaming provides a unique way of preparing and
training financial regulators to make effective loss-mitigating decisions
• • 319in a crisis.
315 Elizabeth A. Duke, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Moving Beyond the Financial Crisis 1 (June 8, 2010), available at
http://www.fedemlreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke201006O8a.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/ST8H-6SY6.
316 See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
317 See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
318 See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
319 See supra Part III.D.
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The policy proposal advanced here is not a silver bullet, and
should be seen as a supplement to, rather than replacement for, other
essential measures such as ensuring sufficiently high capital levels at
key financial institutions.320 It nevertheless addresses an important hole
in the regulatory scheme that has no other plausible plug. Crises will
come, and when they do we must be ready. The relative scarcity of
opportunities to build real-world experience in responding to crises
creates a need for synthetic substitutes.32' Wargames can meet this
need.
121 See Perla & McGrady supra note 260, at 125.
321 See supra Part M.G.
Vol. 34
